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INTRODUCTION

Since at least the early twentieth century, when the emergence of
the automobile saved cities from being buried under the manure
produced by their horse-based transportation system, technologies
have emerged to help solve the unique problems faced by rapidly
growing cities.1 Yet, as with the automobile, no matter how rapid and
seemingly miraculous a technological solution, it will create its own
set of problems that need to be addressed. For a little over a decade,
smart city technology has been promising to cure a wide variety of
cities’ transportation, financial, environmental, and social ills.2 But
unresolved concerns about smart city technology, especially relating
to privacy, are increasingly delaying the development and
implementation of these technologies in democracies.
To explore the themes and issues outlined above, this Article takes
a comparative approach to the challenges that smart cities face.
Specifically, we compare how concerns about smart city technology
play out in wealthy democracies3 and contrast this with the relatively
unchallenged rollout of that technology in the People’s Republic of
China. These wealthy democracies are further divided into the
European Union, where government regulation is stronger, and
North America, where smart cities have faced less regulation, but
perhaps, as a result, more popular resistance.4
Part I of this Article reviews the rise of cities and smart city
technology. We assess the (over)promise of the technology and

1. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Hosed, NEW YORKER (Nov. 9, 2009),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/11/16/hosed
[https://perma.cc/9PSE-V88K].
2. See Teena Maddox, Smart Cities: A Cheat Sheet, TECHREPUBLIC (July 16,
2018),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/smart-cities-the-smart-persons-guide/
[https://perma.cc/G5G6-KYFL].
3. This focus on wealthy democracies is a product of where the leading
companies selling smart city technology are currently based. See These Are the Top
Ten Companies That Build Smart Cities, SMART CITY HUB (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://smartcityhub.com/technology-innnovation/the-top-ten-companies-that-build-s
mart-cities/ [https://perma.cc/8SET-H73X].
4. See generally Mario Weber & Ivana Podnar Žarko, A Regulatory View on
Smart City Services, 19 SENSORS (BASEL) 415, 416 (2019). See also Michael M.
Losavio et al., The Internet of Things and the Smart City: Legal Challenges with
Digital Forensics, Privacy, and Security, 1 SECURITY & PRIVACY 1, 6 (2018).
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examine the increasing pushback and skepticism that smart city
projects and related technology have attracted. In Part II, we turn
our attention to the case of China, examining four different uses of
smart city technology: Alibaba’s City Brain, the monitoring of
Xinjiang, the social credit system, and other uses of facial recognition
technology. Part II then draws overall lessons from these Chinese
cases.
Part III of this Article considers possibilities for improving the use,
regulation, and development of smart city technology in wealthy
democracies. First, we consider the important role surveillance
intermediaries could play in protecting privacy. Second, we look at
the European Union and its General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). Third, we ask whether it is, at this point, possible for
companies based in democracies to catch up with the development of
Chinese smart city technology. Fourth, we look at how and where
competition for smart city technology could play out in the rest of the
world.
Part IV provides recommendations about a possible way forward in
the development of smart cities that would protect privacy and
engender public trust and support.
I. SMART CITIES

Rapid global urbanization driven by overall population increase
and rural-to-urban migration is expected to reach 60% of the world’s
Across the world,
population by 2030, and 68% by 2050.5
urbanization has been closely tied with lower overall poverty rates,
higher educational levels, and higher living standards. It is the main
reason people choose to move to cities: the lure of higher-paying jobs
and greater opportunities. McKinsey projects that the top 100 global
cities by economic growth will contribute 35% of the world’s GDP
growth from 2007 to 2025.6 Cities are seen as engines of progress,
improved services, and technological advancement.
However, city development also produces unintended negative
effects. For example, cities are major contributors to climate change.

5. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., WORLD
URBANIZATION PROSPECTS 2018: HIGHLIGHTS, at 5, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/421,
Sales No. E19.XIII.6 (2019).
6. RICHARD DOBBS ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., URBAN WORLD: MAPPING
THE
ECONOMIC
POWER
OF
CITIES
1
(2011),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Urbanization/Ur
ban%20world/MGI_urban_world_mapping_economic_power_of_cities_full_report.as
hx [https://perma.cc/9M6G-8ZCF].
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While they house 55% of the world’s population7 on only 2% of the
Earth’s surface, cities consume 78% of the world’s energy and
produce more than 60% of the world’s greenhouse gases.8 City
residents’ reliance on fossil fuels to drive their cars, heat their homes,
and run their factories worsen air and water quality and harm wildlife
and its habitats.9 According to the World Health Organization
(WHO), more than 80% of urban inhabitants are exposed to levels of
air pollution above WHO limits which, in turn, increases the risk of
stroke, heart disease, and other chronic and acute respiratory diseases
especially for elderly, youth, and marginalized groups.10 Globally,
urban areas have, on average, 50% less species richness11 than intact
natural habitats.12 As Dr. Eric Strauss, executive director of the
Center for Urban Resilience at Loyola Marymount University-Los
Angeles, notes: “When you have an intact animal diversity, you
control those zoonatic diseases without having to use as much
pesticide.”13 More frequent and severe extreme weather, such as
hurricanes, heat waves, and drought, have not only damaged
infrastructure and food economies but have also widened
socio-economic inequality between those who have the resources and
physical strength to withstand it, and those who do not.14 The urban
poor often live in areas of greatest risk (for example, older homes in

7. Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, Urbanization, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Sept.
2018), https://ourworldindata.org/urbanization [https://perma.cc/3SB4-QTAG].
8. Cities and Pollution Contribute to Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/cities-pollution.shtml
[https://perma.cc/ZS9P-UETT] (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).
9. Urban
Threats,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC,
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/habitats/urban-threats/
[https://perma.cc/778L-4LZA] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
10. WHO Global Urban Ambient Air Pollution Database, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(2016),
http://www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair/databases/cities/en/
[https://perma.cc/T9SP-XYSR].
11. Species richness is the number of different species in an ecosystem. J.A.
Veech, Measuring Biodiversity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ANTHROPOCENE 287–95
(Dominick Dellasala & Michael I. Goldstein eds., 2018).
12. German Center for Integrative Biodiversity Research, Urban Growth Causes
More Biodiversity Loss Outside of Cities, EUREKALERT! (Dec. 9, 2019),
https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2019-12/gcfi-ugc120619.php
[https://perma.cc/2DWY-73DC].
13. Steve Holt, Where Do Urban Animals Go When Their Habitats Disappear?,
CITYLAB
(Nov.
16,
2017),
https://www.citylab.com/environment/2017/11/where-do-urban-animals-go-when-thei
r-habitats-disappear/546002/ [https://perma.cc/3YRQ-654Q].
14. See generally Kimberley Thomas et al., Explaining Differential Vulnerability
to Climate Change: A Social Science Review, WILEY INTERDISC. REV. CLIMATE
CHANGE, Nov. 5, 2018.
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flood zones) and have fewer resources (such as home and health
insurance), information, and financial networks to avoid, prepare for,
and address those risks.15
A. The Rise of Smart Cities

The problems that have accompanied urbanization have forced
many to rethink how we build and maintain cities. Cities can still be
an overall positive force, and proactive city leaders are increasingly
galvanized to create change. Mayors from all over the world are
coming together to share ideas and solutions over their common
urban problems.16 Despite differences in development levels, politics,
and geographies, cities are increasingly expected to do more with
fewer financial resources,17 poor infrastructure,18 and an aging
workforce.19 For example, Indianapolis requires ten times the current
budget to achieve basic fair conditions for roads,20 typical of many
cities. As Zach Adamson, a member of the Indianapolis City-County
Council’s Public Works Committee, noted, “The city is always
behind, there is not enough revenue to cover our needs.”21
Organizations like the C40,22 Rockefeller Foundation,23 and
Bloomberg Philanthropies24 have become bastions of mayoral

15. See S. Nazrul Islam & John Winkel, Climate Change and Social Inequality 6
(U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Working Paper No. 152, 2017).
16. See About Us, GLOBAL COVENANT MAYORS FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY,
https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/5R77-E9AD] (last
visited Feb. 18, 2020).
17. See Michael Maciag, What Are Cities Spending Big On? Increasingly, It’s
GOVERNING
(Sept.
2017),
Debt.,
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-legacy-cities-bills-debt.html
[https://perma.cc/3Q9D-XXQW].
18. See America’s Infrastructure Grade, ASCE’S 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REP.
CARD,
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/americas-grades/
[https://perma.cc/5GSK-VV34] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
19. See Michael Maciag, The “Silver Tsunami” Has Arrived in Government,
(May
31,
2016),
GOVERNING
https://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-government-retirement-survey-center-st
ate-local.html [https://perma.cc/V744-G86Z].
20. John Tuohy, Indy’s Streets Are So Bad, Making Them ‘Fair’ Would Take 10
Times the Current Budget, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2018/02/15/indys-streets-so-bad-making-them-fa
ir-would-take-10-times-current-budget/324044002/ [https://perma.cc/XWL5-XB6M].
21. Id.
22. About
C40,
C40
CITIES,
https://www.c40.org/about
[https://perma.cc/BY3D-NRL5] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
23. About
Us,
ROCKEFELLER
FOUND.,
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/K7AS-A3DD]
(last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
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collaboration and have heightened the sense of urgency and
opportunity for cities to be transformative. These coalitions have
tried to take best practices and innovations from industry, both in
process and in outcome, and seed them in cities. Michael Bloomberg,
former mayor of New York City, naturally brought his managerial
style and industry expertise from running New York City, where he
was famous for saying, “In God we trust. Everyone else bring
data.”25
Industry, in turn, witnessed its own technological breakthroughs
and was eager to proselytize their solutions and increase their sales,
markets, and influence by working with and selling to cities. IBM, for
example, promised a “smarter planet and a new strategic agenda for
progress and growth.”26 Cisco solutions claim that it “encapsulates a
new way of thinking about how communities are designed, built,
managed, and renewed to achieve social, economic, and
environmental sustainability.”27 Start-ups, small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), and consultancies naturally joined, each offering
their own solutions and analysis to support cities.
It is this confluence of urgency and expectation in cities, and the
increased ability with industry-led solutions and optimism, that
birthed smart cities.28 By 2025, the smart cities market is estimated to
be worth $2.4 trillion.29 The convergence is also resulting in more
flexible and diverse jobs that are newly created or replacing
lower-skilled jobs.30 McKinsey estimates that 15% of our global

24. About Us, BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES, https://www.bloomberg.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/6ULP-YSPL] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
25. Bye-Bye,
Bloomberg,
ECONOMIST
(Nov.
2,
2013),
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2013/11/02/bye-bye-bloomberg
[https://perma.cc/A525-MTE9].
26. IBM Builds a Smarter Planet, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/
[https://perma.cc/SGC6-KYWN] (last visited Jan 22, 2020).
27. Seungho Yoo, Songdo: The Hype and Decline of World’s First Smart City, in
SUSTAINABLE CITIES IN ASIA 153 (Federico Caprotti & Li Yu eds., 2017).
28. See generally Mircea Eremia et al., The Smart City Concept in the 21st
Century, 181 PROCEDIA ENGINEERING 12 (2017).
29. See Pramod Borasi, Smart Cities Market by Functional Area (Smart

Governance & Smart Education, Smart Energy, Smart Infrastructure, Smart
Mobility, Smart Healthcare, Smart Building, and Others): Global Opportunity
Analysis and Industry Forecast, 2018–2025, ALLIED MARKET RES. (Nov. 2018),
https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/smart-cities-market
[https://perma.cc/S6JZ-KJRJ].
30. See James Manyika & Kevin Sneader, AI, Automation, and the Future of
Work: Ten Things to Solve For, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (June 2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/ai-automation-and-the-fu
ture-of-work-ten-things-to-solve-for [https://perma.cc/N9DA-BC8N].
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workforce, or 400 million workers, could be displaced by automation
from 2016–2030.31 However, the same McKinsey analysis shows an
“additional labor demand of between 21 percent to 33 percent of the
global workforce (555 million and 890 million jobs) to 2030, more
than offsetting the numbers of jobs lost.”32 Many of the new jobs
created are ones we currently have a hard time imagining and are
based on emerging technology that is becoming part of our built
environment.
For example, Accenture estimates that the
fifth-generation wireless technology (5G) rollout could create 3
million direct U.S. jobs and an additional 2.2 million jobs that support
the 5G economic ecosystem.33
B. The Overpromise of Smart Cities

Nothing could be a clearer sign of the hype that surrounds the
smart city than the multitude of definitions for “smart city” that exist;
the term is most frequently used without any clear or consistent
definition in mind. In an article for the Journal of Urban Technology,
Vito Albino, Umberto Berardi, and Rosa Maria Dangelico collected
23 distinct definitions of smart cities from authoritative sources.34
Liviu-Gabriel Cretu provides a useful breakdown of the two major
trends in smart city thinking: “(1) smart cities should do everything
related to governance and economy using new thinking paradigms
and (2) smart cities are all about networks of sensors, smart devices,
real-time data and ICT integration in every aspect of human life.”35
In this Article, we eschew a specific definition in favor of
considering examples and technologies that are included in projects
or articles that brand themselves as being about smart cities. If we
were to exclude these for not fitting a narrower and more precise
definition of smart city, we risk missing how less-related technology
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Urvashi Verma, 5G Rollout to Create 3 Million New Jobs, Adding $500
Billion to the US Economy, CONNECTED REAL EST. MAG. (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.connectedremag.com/das-in-building-wireless/5g-rollout-to-create-3-milli
on-new-jobs-adding-500-billion-to-the-us-economy/ [https://perma.cc/A42J-F337].
34. See Vito Albino et al., Smart Cities: Definitions, Dimensions, Performance,
and Initiatives, 22 J. URB. TECH. 3, 6–8 (2015). The earliest definition collected comes
was published by R.E. Hall in 2000 and is fairly typical: “A city that monitors and
integrates conditions of all of its critical infrastructures, including roads, bridges,
tunnels, rails, subways, airports seaports, communications, water, power, even major
buildings, can better optimize its resources, plan its preventive maintenance activities,
and monitor security aspects while maximizing services to its citizens.” Id. at 6.
35. Liviu-Gabriel Cretu, Smart Cities Design Using Event-Driven Paradigm and
Semantic Web, 16 INFORMATICA ECONOMICĂ 57, 57 (2012).
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and examples get brought into the discourse on smart cities. Two
examples from the subsequent Section, Quayside’s wooden
construction and the Facebook data breaches, illustrate how concepts
that might not fit many definitions of smart city technology
nevertheless may be held back by (in the case of the former) or
contribute to (in the case of the latter) the pushback against smart
cities.
Smart city solutions were originally seen as a way to solve many of
the problems plaguing cities. With better technology and mastery of
data analytics, cities could become more efficient at providing basic
services like waste and recycling collection,36 identifying potholes,37
and abating pests and rats.38 The technologies were also supposed to
tackle larger problems like public safety and traffic congestion.
McKinsey estimates that smart mobility applications (including
smarter public transit, self-driving electric vehicles, ride-hailing, and
car, bicycle, and scooter-sharing)39 have the potential to cut
commuting times for developing cities by 15% to 20%.40
However, almost as soon as smart city technologies began to be
applied, it became apparent that the technology-driven approach of
smart cities was insufficient to achieve cities’ goals; sensors designed
to notify drivers of free parking spots or public charging stations for
electric vehicles needed trained staff for installation and
maintenance.41 While there were common problems, the one
technology solution fits all approach was not effective — tech

36. See Donald Cambelin, Smarter Waste for the Smart City, COMPOLOGY (Sept.
19,
2017),
http://compology.com/blog/smarter-waste-for-the-smart-city
[https://perma.cc/5NW6-FND6].
37. See Theodora S. Brisimi et al., Sensing and Classifying Roadway Obstacles in
Smart Cities: The Street Bump System, 4 IEEE ACCESS 1301, 1302 (2016).
38. See Linda Poon, Will Cities Ever Outsmart Rats?, CITYLAB (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2017/08/smart-cities-fight-rat-infestations-big-data/
535407/ [https://perma.cc/PH9G-B2TU].
39. See Eric Hannon et al., An Integrated Perspective on the Future of Mobility,
GLOBAL
INST.
(Oct.
2016),
MCKINSEY
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/an-integrate
d-perspective-on-the-future-of-mobility [https://perma.cc/CRC4-HTV9].
40. See Jonathan Woetzel et al., Smart City Technology for a More Liveable
MCKINSEY
GLOBAL
INST.
(June
2018),
Future,
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/
smart-cities-digital-solutions-for-a-more-livable-future
[https://perma.cc/TMT2-S9MR].
41. See Marcos Martínez Euklidiadas, Smart Cities That Failed along the Way,
SMART
CITY
LAB
(Nov.
26,
2019),
https://www.smartcitylab.com/blog/urban-environment/smart-cities-that-failed-alongthe-way/ [https://perma.cc/KK28-FK68].
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companies and vendors were driven by the sales of their products and
services, rather than by development, such that it became a race to
have their technology adopted by as many cities as possible for
domain supremacy.42 Cities purchased smart city technology falsely
thinking that technology alone would make the city smart with
limited knowledge in the application and usage of the technology, and
left unsure of the exact problem they were trying to solve with its
implementation.43 Smart city technology also widened inequalities
within and between cities among those with the technology,
connectivity, and knowledge to use it — and those without it. For
example, while Flint, Michigan’s water supply systems continued to
deteriorate and poison its residents,44 200 miles away in South Bend,
Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg’s administration was able to work with
the University of Notre Dame to install sensors under manhole covers
and implement a smart sewer system.45
The smart cities backlash created new thinking about technology
and its relationship with city development. Smart cities became best
thought of not as an end state, but a continuous improvement process
that allows cities and communities of all sizes to pursue the most
suitable integration of technology and data to increase their quality of
life. It concentrates on the local context and meeting the community
where they are, as well as creative problem-solving with an enhanced
toolkit that includes technology, data, as well as policy and financing
solutions. Smart cities, such as Smart Columbus,46 Chicago’s City
Tech,47 and Dallas Innovation Alliance,48 are utilizing this kind of

42. See Laura Bliss, 2018 Was the Year of the Smart City Skeptic, CITYLAB (Dec.
27,
2018),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/12/smart-city-uber-google-facebook-tech
nology-startup-solutions/579025/ [https://perma.cc/VRE8-NDH5].
43. See Ben Green, Cities Are Not Technology Problems: What Smart Cities
Companies
Get
Wrong,
METROPOLIS
(Mar.
4,
2019),
https://www.metropolismag.com/cities/ben-green-smart-enough-city/
[https://perma.cc/L8RE-WEBE].
44. See Melissa Denchak, Flint Water Crisis: Everything You Need to Know,
NAT’L
RESOURCE
DEF.
COUNCIL
(Nov.
8,
2018),
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/flint-water-crisis-everything-you-need-know
[https://perma.cc/UP2N-LP7H].
45. Debra Lam & John Wagner Givens, Small and Smart: Why and How Smart
City Solutions Can and Should Be Adapted to the Unique Needs of Smaller Cities,
12 NEW GLOBAL STUD. 21, 31–32 (2018).
46. See
We
Are
Smart,
Columbus,
SMART
COLUMBUS,
https://smart.columbus.gov/about [https://perma.cc/9QDA-78QL] (last visited Feb.
18, 2020).
47. See About City Tech, CITY TECH, http://www.citytech.org/about-overview
[https://perma.cc/X6A6-M85T] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
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empowering, people-centric framework, with new types of solutions
and public-private partnerships. Funded by public and private
grants,49 the efforts include Multimodal Trip Planning Applications
and common transportation payment systems,50 and developing
demand management opportunities to reduce freight delivery
congestion51 and open data initiatives.52 Yet, even more rapid than
the progress of smart city thinking and projects has been the backlash
against smart city technology, which we consider in the next Section.
C. Smart City Skepticism

“CityLab,” The Atlantic’s publication devoted to the future of
cities, declared 2018 the year of the smart city skeptic.53 Their
run-down of the challenges that smart cities face included both
meaningful setbacks to an important smart city project as well as
more general and less immediate concerns, such as how the rise of
autonomous vehicles might change city planning. The problems
described were distressingly familiar, with violations of data privacy
topping of the list. Singled out was the revelation that Facebook had
given its business partners access to personal data, exempting them
from its own privacy rules. In total, Facebook provided 150
companies, including Netflix and Spotify, access to user data that
included users’ private messages.54
In some ways, it is misleading to name the above Facebook
example, and other similar violations of online privacy, as a setback
for smart cities. Because the collection and analysis of data is at the
core of smart cities, every blow toward citizen trust in data collection,
analysis, and storage may ultimately have a significant impact on

48. See
About
DIA,
DALLAS
INNOVATION
ALLIANCE,
http://www.dallasinnovationalliance.com/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/C4P8-3RWQ]
(last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
49. See, e.g., We Are Smart, Columbus, supra note 46.
50. See Multi-Modal Trip Planning Application & Common Payment System,
SMART
COLUMBUS,
https://smart.columbus.gov/projects/multi-modal-trip-planning-application
[https://perma.cc/KWG6-6A5Z] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020).
51. See City Solutions, CITY TECH, http://www.citytech.org/city-solutions
[https://perma.cc/H3PD-6J5S] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020).
52. See Dallas OpenData, CITY OF DALLAS, https://www.dallasopendata.com/
[https://perma.cc/G46Q-A4EK] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020).
53. Bliss, supra note 42.
54. Gabriel J. X. Dance et al., As Facebook Raised a Privacy Wall, It Carved an
Opening
for
Tech
Giants,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/FJY7-HT4N].
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public goodwill, which smart city projects in democracies must rely on
to progress. Indeed, this Article will show that it is precisely these
types of concerns that are likely to impede the development of smart
cities in democracies and ultimately allow the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) to control the future of smart city technology.
Setbacks to smart city efforts may come in the form of revelations
that damage general public opinion about emerging technologies
rather than events that are specific to the development of any actual
smart city projects. Another major source of concern for smart city
advocates and skeptics is that many smart city solutions were not as
close at hand as previously thought.55 For example, after years of
predictions that autonomous vehicles (AVs) were just over the
horizon, stalled development and a fatal accident have suggested that
self-driving cars are decades away, not years.56 AVs are more closely
related to smart cities than social media, but would not necessarily
hold back the other aspects of smart cities projects. Here again,
China seems to have an advantage. As this Article demonstrates,
Chinese citizens are less skeptical of new technologies, irrespective of
how deeply flawed they may be.57
Closer still to the core of smart city strategies, car-, bike-, and
scooter-sharing services have also come under increased scrutiny.58
Evidence that ridesharing exacerbates, rather than improves both
traffic and carbon emissions — serious problems that smart cities are

55. See Bliss, supra note 42.
56. Neal E. Boudette, Despite High Hopes, Self-Driving Cars Are ‘Way in the
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
17,
2019),
Future’,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/business/self-driving-autonomous-cars.html
[https://perma.cc/TDF7-KDCW].
57. Paul Mozur, Wild about Tech, China Even Loves Robot Waiters That Can’t
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
21,
2018),
Serve,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/technology/china-future-robot-waiters.html
[https://perma.cc/3TE3-2ZSD].
58. See Ziru Li et al., An Empirical Analysis of On-Demand Ride Sharing and
Traffic
Congestion
5
(Sept.
25,
2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2843301
[https://perma.cc/B62N-PP6E]; Daniel Castro, E-Scooter Bans Show Cities Are
Hesitant
to
Embrace
Innovation,
GOV’T
TECH.
(Mar.
2019),
https://www.govtech.com/opinion/E-Scooter-Bans-Show-Cities-Are-Hesitant-to-Emb
race-Innovation.html [https://perma.cc/2TH6-TEDF]; Luz Lazo, Dockless Bike,
Scooter Firms Clash with U.S. Cities Over Regulations, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/dockless-bike-scooter-fir
ms-clash-with-us-cities-over-regulations/2018/08/04/0db29bd0-9419-11e8-a679-b09212
fb69c2_story.html [https://perma.cc/RNW4-2RS7]; Jane Lee, Bike-Sharing
Companies Face an Uphill Ride in U.S., REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-bikesharing/bike-sharing-companies-face-an-u
phill-ride-in-u-s-idUSKCN1GS0YX [https://perma.cc/X5EZ-QCV5].
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meant to ameliorate — may be mounting.59 Micromobility solutions
such as bike- and e-scooter-sharing services have faced criticism over
blocking sidewalks, breaking traffic ordinances, increasing emergency
Cities, including West
room visits, and causing accidents.60
Hollywood, California, Nashville, Tennessee, and Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, have forced e-scooter-sharing services out of their
cities; other local governments, among them Columbia, South
Carolina, and Davis, California passed preemptive scooter-sharing
bans.61 Meanwhile, cities such as Atlanta, Georgia have pushed
operators out with regulations, including high impound fees and a ban
on night use.62 Yet, e-scooters remain popular and can likely help
reduce carbon emissions.63 Most issues arise not from inherent
problems in the technology, concept, or appeal, but in a lack of both
physical and legal infrastructure.64 Laws and regulations that apply to
e-scooters are often unclear, and cities and scooter companies appear
to be tacitly acknowledging, if not encouraging, rule-breaking by
scooter riders. Mandates to wear helmets, stay off of sidewalks, and
read voluminous terms and conditions are “more honored in the

59. See Lauren Alexander & Marta González, Assessing the Impact of Real-Time
Ridesharing on Urban Trafﬁc using Mobile Phone Data 9 (2015) (unpublished
presentation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with University of
Maryland,
Baltimore
County),
https://userpages.umbc.edu/~nroy/courses/fall2018/cmisr/papers/Real-time-Rideshari
ng_Alexander.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7GU-289P]; Gregory D. Erhardt et al., Do
Transportation Network Companies Decrease or Increase Congestion?, SCI.
ADVANCES,
May
8,
2019,
at
4–6,
https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/5/5/eaau2670.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LHB-689C]. Yet, other studies have found conflicting results. See
Li et al., supra note 58.
60. Castro, supra note 58.
61. Id.; Emily Maher, Davis Bans Electric Scooter Companies, for Now, KCRA
(Oct.
30,
2018),
https://www.kcra.com/article/davis-bans-electric-scooter-companies-for-now/2446157
9 [https://perma.cc/LK8L-TM6W].
62. Raisa Habersham, Lime Scooters Leaving Atlanta, Cites ‘Significant’ Scooter
Impound
Fees,
ATLANTA
J.
CONST.
(Jan.
9,
2020),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/lime-scooters-leaving-atlanta-cites-significant-scooter
-impound-fees/0xL0NUZa2aDs2pt0eQ6JQI/ [https://perma.cc/2PNJ-3NLP].
63. See Joseph Hollingsworth et al., Are E-Scooters Polluters? The
Environmental Impacts of Shared Dockless Electric Scooters, 14 ENVTL. RES.
LETTERS 1, 9 (2019).
64. See John Frazer, With the Help of Regulators, Micromobility Will Be Poised
for a Massive Surge in Adoption, FORBES (June 13, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnfrazer1/2019/06/13/with-the-help-of-regulators-micr
omobility-will-be-poised-for-a-massive-surge-in-adoption/
[https://perma.cc/F49F-A4JE].

2020]

SMARTER CITIES OR BIGGER BROTHER? 841

breach than in the observance.”65 In this sense, e-scooters neatly
embody the current state of most smart cities technology — an
emerging technological solution lacking sufficient regulatory, legal,
and physical infrastructure, and heavily dependent on public opinion
for its continued existence and expansion.
Most ominously for smart city advocates, however, is the fact that
the largest smart city project in North America has come under heavy
public criticism. The Toronto Quayside project by Sidewalk Labs (a
subsidiary of Alphabet, Google’s parent company), which was
supposed to be the first neighborhood built “from the internet up,”66
experienced several major setbacks.67 First, the board of Waterfront
Toronto, the organization administering the project, experienced a
series of public resignations and firings related to concerns over
Quayside.68 Saadia Muzaffar, a member of Waterfront Toronto’s
Digital Strategy Advisory Panel, levied a very public resignation,
citing “a blatant disregard for resident concerns about data and digital
infrastructure.”69 Second, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association
filed a suit against Waterfront Toronto in addition to the
governments of Toronto, Ontario, and Canada.70 The suit alleges
that the “Quayside Agreements empower Sidewalk Labs and others
to effect historically unprecedented, non-consensual, inappropriate

65. Jesse Halfon, A Lawyer Explains Why Electric Scooter Laws Don’t Work,
CITYLAB
(June
28,
2019),
https://www.citylab.com/perspective/2019/06/electric-scooters-dockless-regulations-lia
bility-helmet-laws/592861/ [https://perma.cc/B346-9DXU].
66. Henry Grabar, Building Googletown, SLATE (Oct. 25, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/metropolis/2017/10/sidewalk_labs_quayside
_development_in_toronto_is_google_s_first_shot_at.html
[https://perma.cc/5MA6-4UEV].
67. See Dan Bilefsky, Toronto’s City of Tomorrow Is Scaled Back Amid Privacy
Concerns,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
31,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/world/canada/toronto-google-sidewalk.html
[https://perma.cc/54XD-WRP5].
68. Josh O’Kane, Ontario Government to Fire Three Waterfront Toronto
Directors Over Sidewalk Labs Partnership, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/toronto/article-ontario-government-to-firethree-waterfront-toronto-directors-over/ [https://perma.cc/FFJ2-XEZH]; Jordan
Pearson, Toronto Advisor Resigns Over Data Concerns with Google’s Smart City
Project,
VICE:
MOTHERBOARD
(Oct.
4,
2018),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3km74w/google-smart-city-in-toronto-advisor-resi
gns-data-privacy [https://perma.cc/9CKJ-KDWJ].
69. Pearson, supra note 68.
70. CCLA v. Waterfront Toronto, et. al: Public Court Documents to Date,
CANADIAN
C.L.
ASS’N
(June
24,
2019),
https://ccla.org/quayside-project-application-documents/
[https://perma.cc/76AK-CWN4].
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mass-capture surveillance and [the] commoditization of personal data
of individuals who live in, work in or visit Quayside.”71 As a result of
the popular backlash, the Quayside project has been significantly
scaled back.72
To a certain extent, the setback of some smart cities technology
and projects, like burdensome regulations on micromobility solutions
and truncations to the Quayside project, was the inevitable result of a
bubble of excitement and hype that was unsustainable and bound to
burst. Yet, many of these specific problems are far from inevitable
and are primarily issues tied to public opinion. Concerns about smart
city technology, especially as related to privacy, should not be as
damaging as they first appear and should be surmountable for two
major reasons.
First, most of the setbacks related to smart city technology are
centered around privacy concerns that, while important, reflect only a
subset of smart city technologies. From wooden building construction
to public transit optimization, to smart sewers and trashcans, many of
the technologies with the most potential are uncontroversial. They
raise few, if any, privacy concerns, especially if designed correctly
from the outset. Returning to the example of South Bend, Indiana,
the installed sensors under manhole covers dramatically increased the
efficiency of water management in their sewers and allowed them to
forgo expensive infrastructure upgrades.73 As with any technology
that attaches internet-enabled sensors to objects, many pieces of
smart city technology are part of the Internet of Things (IoT). But
sensors installed inside trashcans or under manhole covers generally
do not present privacy concerns or a security danger if hacked.
Projects can disentangle uncontroversial smart cities technologies
such as improved construction techniques and materials, increased
energy efficiency, and less-problematic sensors. Projects that focus on
timber construction, optimizing bus routes, and unobjectionable
sensors can advance while leaving behind technologies that rely on
facial recognition, collecting personal data from smartphones, and

71. James McLeod, Civil Liberties Group Sues to Quash Sidewalk Labs Project,
with Final Master Plan Due Within Weeks, FIN. POST (Apr. 17, 2019),

https://business.financialpost.com/technology/civil-liberties-group-sues-to-quash-side
walk-labs-project-with-final-master-plan-due-within-weeks
[https://perma.cc/7Y56-QN72].
72. Bilefsky, supra note 67.
73. Greg Swiercz, Sensors Help Combat Sewer Problems in South Bend, Ind.,
GOV’T
TECH.
(Feb.
15,
2017),
http://www.govtech.com/fs/Sensors-Help-Combat-Sewer-Problems-in-South-Bend-In
d.html [https://perma.cc/5Q6U-73MR]; supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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other sources. Even if privacy concerns related to personal data
cannot be overcome, it should be possible to move forward with many
innovations, which raise fewer objections.
Second, privacy issues around smart cities arise primarily from
concern over what private companies, such as Google’s Sidewalk
Labs, will do with the potentially tremendous quantity, and
unprecedented quality, of data that smart city infrastructure allows
them to collect.74 Considering the high costs and technology involved
in most smart city projects, private companies are probably an
inevitable part of advancing smart cities. In the United States,
repeated revelations about how large technology companies collect,
store, use, and abuse our data has damaged the public’s trust.75 Yet,
stricter laws and enforcement in the European Union have led to a
higher level of public trust that private companies will handle their
data appropriately — and face repercussions if they do not.76 While it
would be an uphill battle, companies and governments in North
America need to help improve attitudes toward smart city technology
by building a successful track record of protecting people’s data,
thereby making the public more willing to trust smart cities with
increased data collection. Increased trust that data is sufficiently
protected will ultimately increase people’s trust in the companies
collecting such data, as well as the government’s regulation of these
companies.
Increased skepticism over and pushback to even fairly
straightforward applications of smart cities technologies seems likely
to delay the development and implementation of smart cities in
democracies. In a liberal democracy with a robust rule of law, new
technology that interacts with the public sphere, as most smart city
technology does, requires at least a reasonable amount of public
acceptance of the new technology. This trust can be built with

74. See generally Zaheer Allam, The Emergence of Anti-Privacy and Control at
the Nexus between the Concepts of Safe City and Smart City, 2 SMART CITIES 96
(2019); Ellen P. Goodman & Julia Powles, Urbanism under Google: Lessons from
Sidewalk Toronto, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 457 (2019); Rob Walker, Privacy, Equity,
and the Future of the Smart City, Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y: Land Lines Mag.,
January 2019.
75. See Kim Hart, Americans Don’t Trust Tech Companies on Data Privacy,
AXIOS
(Apr.
23,
2018),
https://www.axios.com/distrust-social-media-firms-to-protect-privacy-survey-8b95db5
1-f137-46e3-a239-a5f304f0ac1b.html [https://perma.cc/97A4-QDF9].
76. Luc Burgelman, Council Post: GDPR and the Trusted Framework for Data
Privacy,
FORBES
(June
21,
2018,
9:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/06/21/gdpr-and-the-trusted-fram
ework-for-data-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/C6D2-W7M9].
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increased transparency, education, and open dialogue, which the
public values but is ultimately a time-consuming process. The idea
that deliberative processes in democracies would delay development
that otherwise could rapidly move ahead has been seen in previous
instances — as has the fact that the PRC often ignores these concerns
and speeds ahead. For example, in 2008, The Economist noted that
“it took as long to conduct a public inquiry into the proposed
construction of Heathrow’s Terminal Five as it took to build Beijing’s
new airport terminal from scratch.”77 Because the concerns raised by
smart cities are newer and more complex, the time gap between
development in democracies and China is likely to be, and become,
even wider.
Privacy concerns can hold up the development of smart city
projects in part because many smart city innovations are popularly
seen as making a relatively small contribution, or even as providing a
frivolous luxury. Yet, delays in the development of smart cities
projects are potentially incredibly damaging for two reasons. First,
some of the problems that smart cities help address, especially climate
change,78 are so acute that there is little time to lose. Second, if
companies in the United States and other democracies are
substantially delayed in their development of smart cities projects,
this will only increase the advantage of companies that are based in
the PRC, which will then increase the use of Chinese smart cities
technology across the world.79 As this Article argues, the technology
developed and sold by PRC-based companies is likely to lack basic
privacy protections, empower authoritarians, and perhaps even make
countries who utilize the technology vulnerable to the PRC.
D. Privacy Challenges for Smart Cities

Because almost any definition of smart cities involves the effective
collection and use of data to improve city governance and services,

77. China’s Infrastructure Splurge — Rushing on by Road, Rail and Air,
ECONOMIST
(Feb.
14,
2008),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2008/02/14/rushing-on-by-road-rail-and-air
[https://perma.cc/DRW9-FC4S].
78. See Andrew Howard, Do Only “Smart Cities” Have the Answer?,
SCHRODERS
(July
21,
2017),
https://www.schroders.com/en/insights/economics/do-only-smart-cities-have-the-answ
er/ [https://perma.cc/JP2B-KRA9].
79. Allison Graham, China Is Pulling Ahead of North America on Smart Cities,
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(July
10,
2019),
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/china-pulling-ahead-north-america-smart-cit
ies [https://perma.cc/FUR2-G2AP].
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concerns about data and privacy are inevitable and imminently
reasonable.
According to Lilian Edwards, Professor of
E-Governance at the University of Strathclyde, the key security
challenges faced by smart cities are: (1) a lack of meaningful consent;
(2) private data collected from public interactions; (3) privatization of
both infrastructure and data; (4) repurposing data from the IoT; and
(5) storage of data in the cloud.80 There is no perfect solution to
these problems; a balance needs to be struck between protecting
people’s data and using data for the public good, from fighting
climate change to improving city services. The costs in terms of lost
privacy and other concerns need to be balanced with the lost
opportunity cost of not implementing these technologies. Giving up
on technologies that help fight climate change or provide better
public transit and other city services to underserved neighborhoods
may be too high a price to pay to protect certain types of personal
data. More important than any specific solution to these challenges is
the need for ongoing dialogue about how to handle data in an
inclusive, consistent, and transparent manner, which will, in turn,
facilitate meaningful trust among the public.
Public backlash against smart city projects has the potential to
derail even uncontroversial elements of smart cities. The Quayside
project, for example, intends to take unprecedented steps by using
wood as its primary building material for buildings up to 35 stories.81
Because concrete is a major contributor to carbon dioxide emissions,
and wood is renewable, lighter, and an excellent way of storing excess
carbon, the Quayside project could pilot innovation by making a
major contribution towards climate change reduction.82 However,
while Sidewalk Labs tried to highlight its innovative wood
construction, both the public and its own advisory panel pushed back
against the project based on other privacy concerns83 regarding how
data would be collected and used by a private company.84 Saadia

80. See Lilian Edwards, Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart Cities: A
Critical EU Law Perspective, 2 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 28, 28 (2016).
81. Kira Barrett, Sidewalk Labs Is Building a Smart City Entirely of Mass Timber.
What Could Go Wrong?, SMART CITIES DIVE (Aug. 5, 2019),

https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/news/sidewalk-labs-mass-timber-CLT-buildings-gree
n-materials-waterfront-toronto-construction/560045/ [https://perma.cc/5J75-8D6U].
82. Id.
83. Pearson, supra note 68.
84. Leyland Cecco, “Surveillance Capitalism”: Critic Urges Toronto to Abandon
Smart
City
Project,
GUARDIAN
(June
6,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/jun/06/toronto-smart-city-google-project-pri
vacy-concerns [https://perma.cc/F2RH-RK5M].
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Muzaffar, a member of Waterfront Toronto’s Digital Strategy
Advisory Panel who resigned, described the problem with the public
consultation process. She argued that instead of addressing privacy
concerns, “time was spent [by Waterfront Toronto] . . . talking about
buildings made of wood and the width of one-way streets, things no
one has contested or expressed material concern for in this entire
process.”85 If Sidewalk Labs and other companies spearheading
smart cities efforts86 cannot create strategies to overcome concerns
about their projects, especially related to privacy, then even the
popular elements of their plans might be abandoned — or at least
significantly delayed. The cost to society and the planet in terms of
lost opportunity could be significant. The opportunities that such
delays present to Chinese companies, on the other hand, which have
less concern for privacy and transparency, could be even larger.87
II. CHINA

Part II examines the development of smart city technology in the
PRC. We give particular attention to four cases: Alibaba’s City
Brain, the monitoring of Xinjiang, China’s social credit system, and
other uses of facial recognition technology. Finally, we summarize
and draw conclusions based on what these fairly different applications
of technology tell us as a whole.
Across a variety of industries that include smart cities and related
technologies, China’s companies are increasingly competitive with
their counterparts from North America, out-innovating them in a
variety of fields, from artificial intelligence to 5G.88 Several factors
help make China a world-leader in smart cities: First, the tremendous
size of the Chinese market, in terms of both population and GDP.89
Second, the state uses strategic investment, tax incentives, and a
variety of other inducements and policies to support Chinese
companies, seeking to make the PRC a world-wide leader in
technology and innovation. The “Made in China 2025” initiative has
formalized these policies into a prominent national campaign aimed

85. Pearson, supra note 68.
86. See These Are the Top Ten Companies That Build Smart Cities, supra note 3
(listing the top companies that help build smart cities).
87. See infra Section III.C.
88. See Graham, supra note 79.
89. Anja Kielmann, Chinese Tech Companies Are Leading the New Global
Innovation
Revolution,
DRUM
(Nov.
14,
2019),
https://www.thedrum.com/opinion/2019/11/14/chinese-tech-companies-are-leading-th
e-new-global-innovation-revolution [https://perma.cc/7E3A-YNBR].
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at making China a global technological superpower and costing the
state at least hundreds of billions of dollars.90 Third, the state further
assists Chinese companies by blocking foreign firms from operating in
spaces that it deems “sensitive,” especially search and social media.
Prominent examples include the blocking of Facebook, Google, and
Twitter.91 This not only allows China greater control over industries
and applications it deems “sensitive,” but has allowed other Chinese
technology companies to fill a space that American firms otherwise
dominate in most of the world. Fourth, and most important to our
argument, Chinese companies enjoy an advantage when it comes to
smart cities technology because they face relatively little need to deal
with issues related to privacy, public opinion, or other concerns about
the implementation of new technology. Chinese companies working
in conjunction with the state can power ahead in implementing
technology with little concern for public opinion and even less worry
about legal or political setbacks of the kind Quayside faced.
The PRC’s rapid rise to dominance in several high technology
fields, especially renewable energy, provides an instructive example
for the possible future of many smart city technologies. Beginning in
the 1990s, China invested heavily in renewable energy with a
particular focus on photovoltaic panels (PVs). In total, the Chinese
state may have contributed as much as $47 billion to build its solar
manufacturing industry.92 The results were even more impressive.
“Between 2008 and 2013, China’s fledgling solar-electric panel
industry dropped world prices by 80 percent.”93 China leapfrogged
previous market leaders — the United States, Germany, and Japan —
not only in production but also in patents. Its current market
dominance in the industry seems, at least for the time being,
unassailable.
It is often claimed that the Chinese are more likely to embrace new
technology than people in other countries, especially wealthy
democracies, because the population as a whole is less distrusting of
it. “‘Chinese are much more willing to try something new just

90. MAX J. ZENGLEIN & ANNA HOLZMANN, EVOLVING MADE IN CHINA 2025 8
(2019).
91. Paige Leskin, Here Are All the Major US Tech Companies Blocked Behind
China’s
‘Great
Firewall’,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Oct.
10,
2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/major-us-tech-companies-blocked-from-operating-i
n-china-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/GE2Z-EDT8].
92. John Fialka, Why China Is Dominating the Solar Industry, SCI. AM. (Dec. 16,
2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-china-is-dominating-thesolar-industry/ [https://perma.cc/A5CN-LUS8].
93. Id.
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because it looks cool,’ said Andy Tian, Chief Executive of
Beijing-based Asia Innovations Group, which runs mobile
applications. ‘It sounds superficial. It is superficial. But that’s the
driver of progress [in the PRC] in a lot of cases.’”94 This general
enthusiasm for technology may help overcome concerns about
privacy and other issues. Some data likewise suggests that Chinese
consumers are more comfortable with a variety of technologies likely
to figure into smart city projects.95 In the most extreme cases,
Chinese and Americans take the opposite view of technology. A
survey by OC&C Strategy Consultants found that 70% of Americans
say that they would not trust an autonomous vehicle, while 72% of
Chinese said they would.96 Yet, not all results are clear cut, and the
causes and nature of Chinese attitudes towards privacy and
technology is worth further examination.
In 2018, the CEO of Baidu, China’s biggest search engine, publicly
stated: “I think Chinese people are more open or less sensitive about
the privacy issue. If they are able to trade privacy for convenience,
for safety, for efficiency, in a lot of cases they’re willing to do that.”97
The comments reflected a reasonably common point of view but were
also met with significant public criticism. When it comes to online
privacy, the gap between Chinese and Western attitudes is less
extreme but still appears to be significant. A 2019 survey by Ipsos
Group found that only 11% of Chinese were very concerned about
their online privacy, compared to 26% of respondents in the United
States.98 The overall numbers of those who were concerned or very
concerned were similar at 68% and 78% respectively.99 Chinese lack
of concern seems even more dramatic because it puts China in similar

94. Mozur, supra note 57.
95. See Gil Press, Would You Trust a Self-Driving Car? 70% of Americans Say
‘No,’
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of
Chinese
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96. Id.
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(Mar.
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2018),
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ne%20Privacy%20%26%20Trust.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAB5-FKYN].
99. Id.
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territory, primarily with wealthy and well-run democracies such as
Japan, Germany, and Sweden.100 Countries more similar to China, in
terms of development and political system, tended towards the other
end of the scale; in Egypt, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Mexico,
Korea, Brazil, and Tunisia, over 40% reported being very concerned
about online privacy.101 That China looks more like well-run wealthy
democracies than developed countries hints at a theme that will be
examined later in this Article: for a middle-income authoritarian
regime, China seems to be uniquely capable and trusted by its own
people.102
As China becomes wealthier, better-educated, and more
tech-savvy, it is possible that attitudes towards online privacy are
shifting. Both the Ipsos poll and a report by Kantar China Insights, a
media consultancy, suggest that concern about personal privacy
online is growing.103 There is even evidence that the Chinese state is
responding to increasing concerns about online data privacy.104
China’s new e-commerce law, which took effect in 2019, contains
important provisions for protecting the privacy of consumers.105
How any given Chinese person or the country as a whole feels
about sacrificing privacy may matter less when the state and powerful
tech companies act as though Chinese care little about privacy.
Ordinary Chinese people have relatively little control over the rapidly
growing use of a wide variety of technologies with the serious
potential to infringe on their privacy.106 In meaningful ways, Chinese

See id.
Id.
See infra Section II.E.
See IPSOS PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 98; Guo Min (郭敏), 2017 Kaidu
Zhongguo Shejiaomeiti Yingxiang Baogao (2017 凯度中国社交媒体影响报告),
100.
101.
102.
103.

KANTAR (June 6, 2017), https://cn.kantar.com/媒体动态/社交/2017/2017凯度中国社交
媒体影响报告/ [https://perma.cc/AYH4-2TQC].
104. See Winston Wenyan Ma, China Is Waking Up to Data Protection and
Privacy. Here’s Why That Matters, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/11/china-data-privacy-laws-guideline/
[https://perma.cc/HP8P-US72].
105. See Sara Xia, Implications of China’s E-Commerce Law, AMCHAM SHANGHAI
(Apr.
7,
2019),
https://www.amcham-shanghai.org/en/article/implications-chinas-e-commerce-law
[https://perma.cc/39AY-2FWM].
106. See “Cha Pingjun,” Zhongguoren budebu Yong Yinsi Jiaohuan Bianlixing (中
国人不得不用隐私交换便利性。), WECHAT OFFICIAL ACCTS. PLATFORM (微信公众
平台)
(Mar.
26,
2018),
http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzA5NDc1NzQ4MA==&mid=2653328398&idx=1
&sn=f0b7524eddf6b86aa2b4a14bfba0f690&chksm=8b9b8309bcec0a1f5a2910a44befac
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citizens have already been forced to accept technology107 that many in
developed democracies remain skeptical of or even openly resist.108
In major Chinese cities, mobile phone-based payment systems, like
Alipay and WeChat Pay, are so pervasive that using cash or credit
cards falls between inconvenient and impossible, even for low-value
face-to-face transactions like buying a bottle of water. Similarly,
WeChat (Weixin) — an application that serves messaging, payment,
and many other functions — is so ubiquitous that it is difficult to live
a normal life or conduct business without it.109 It is possible,
therefore, that to the extent the Chinese do have laxer attitudes about
potential privacy-infringing technology, this is a consequence of an
environment where there is relatively little choice but to opt into such
technology, irrespective of overriding privacy concerns. Additionally,
the market dominance of a few national champions with close ties to
the state gives consumers few choices in terms of competing providers
that might take their privacy more seriously.110
The advantage that Chinese companies have as a result of being
able to largely ignore privacy concerns and many other regulatory
hurdles is clear to Chinese companies, the state that supports them,
and their competitors.111 In the words of Dong Tao, Vice Chairman
for Greater China at Credit Suisse Private Banking Asia Pacific, “I’m
not saying Chinese companies are better than American companies,
I’m not saying Chinese engineers are better than American engineers.
What will make China be big in AI and big data is: China has no
serious law protecting data privacy.”112 As the following Sections
show, these advantages allow for Chinese companies to be involved in
projects that companies in Europe or North America could not even
contemplate.

b09b781e71dcc62f3df7cc516006f64c8a19b5d3ba688d#rd
[https://perma.cc/P7Q8RB23].
107. See Shen, supra note 97.
108. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., ARE AMERICANS EMBRACING MOBILE PAYMENTS?
(2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2019/10/mobilepayments_brief_
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2Y6-QX5N].
109. See Audrey Jiajia Li, Learning to Survive Without WeChat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opinion/learning-to-survive-withoutwechat-in-china.html [https://perma.cc/4NFH-6QML].
110. See “Cha Pinjun,” supra note 106.
111. See Yen Nee Lee, China Will Win the A.I. Race, According to Credit Suisse,
CNBC (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/22/credit-suisse-chinawill-win-the-ai-race-due-to-lack-of-serious-laws-on-data-protection.html
[https://perma.cc/5R3A-NADX].
112. Id.
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It is unclear, however, if all the advantages that Chinese companies
currently enjoy will last. Perhaps precisely because it is not a
democracy, the Chinese state is very sensitive to public opinion.113 Its
supportive attitude of companies that care little for its citizens’
privacy may change if the state becomes seriously concerned that
attitudes of average Chinese people are shifting to more closely
match the higher levels of concern visible in other middle-income
countries. This would be similar to improvements made in air quality
that China experienced as a result of public backlash against
high-levels of air pollution, helping to shift the government’s
previously laissez-faire attitude about heavy polluters.114
In the Sections below, this Article considers three of the PRC’s
largest-scale and most Orwellian uses of data in the public sphere, as
well as several smaller-scale examples of the use of facial recognition
technology in the PRC.
A. City Brain

If Sidewalk Lab’s Quayside project is the ambitious but
problematic poster child for smart cities in wealthy democracies, it
pales in comparison to China’s most important smart city project,
Alibaba’s City Brain.115 According to Xian-Sheng Hua of Alibaba
Group’s DAMO Academy (Academy for Discovery, Adventure,
Momentum, and Outlook):
City Brain is an end-to-end system whose goal is to glean
irreplaceable values from big city data, specifically from videos, with

113. See Jidong Chen et al., Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field
Experiment in China, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 383, 383–84 (2016); Jonathan Hassid,
China’s Responsiveness to Internet Opinion: A Double-Edged Sword, 44 J.

CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 39, 39–68 (2015).
114. See Meir Alkon & Erik H. Wang, Pollution Lowers Support for China’s
Regime: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Beijing, 80 J. POL. 327, 327–31 (2018);
Ling Li et al., Public Participation in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals in
China: Evidence from the Practice of Air Pollution Control, 201 J. CLEANER
PRODUCTION 499, 499–506 (2018); Xiaowen Zhang, The Reemerging Concern Over
Air Pollution in China: The Smog of the State’s Efforts to Guide Public Opinion, 23
J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 519, 519–20 (2018).
115. Xian-Sheng Hua, The City Brain: Towards Real-Time Search for the
Real-World, in THE 41ST INTERNATIONAL ACM SIGIR CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT IN INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 1343–44 (2018) [hereinafter Hua,
Towards Real-Time Search]; see Xiansheng Hua et al., The City Brain: Practice of
Large-Scale Artificial Intelligence in the Real World, 1 IET SMART CITIES 1, 1 (2019)
[hereinafter Hua et al., Practice of Large-Scale AI]; see also Abigail Beall, In China,
Alibaba’s Data-Hungry AI Is Controlling (and Watching) Cities, WIRED (May 30,
2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/alibaba-city-brain-artificial-intelligence-chinakuala-lumpur [https://perma.cc/ZG7G-WPU8].
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the assistance of rapidly evolving AI technologies and fast-growing
computing capacity.
From cognition to optimization, to
decision-making, from search to prediction and ultimately, to
intervention, City Brain improves the way we manage the city, as
well as the way we live in it.116

In short, City Brain appears to be an effort to collect, consolidate,
analyze, and implement as much data relevant to city functions as
digitally possible.
Currently, City Brian has five major applications: (1) monitoring
city “vital signs” such as traffic across multiple modes of transport; (2)
monitoring for public security purposes; (3) improving traffic on a
micro-level (controlling traffic lights and transit routes and
departures); (4) route optimization for emergency response vehicles;
and (5) assisting with urban planning.117 According to Alibaba,
“utilizing comprehensive real-time city data, City Brain holistically
optimizes urban public resources by instantly correcting defects in
urban operations. This has led to numerous breakthroughs in urban
government models, service models, and industrial development.”118
As with Quayside and other smart cities projects in wealthy
democracies, many of the most beneficial applications of the
technology, such as optimizing traffic, emergency services, and public
transport, are likely to be popular and are relatively unobjectionable
from a privacy standpoint. The public security applications, however,
are a very different matter.
In a way, City Brain is the logical conclusion of an effort that
started on the other side of the world when the United Kingdom
installed four closed-circuit cameras in Trafalgar Square in 1960.119
Since then, the United Kingdom has led the world as one of the most
surveilled countries, with a total of around 5.9 million closed-circuit
television cameras.120 While the amount of video collected is
enormous, however, the system is old, “a muddle of more than a

116. Hua, Towards Real-Time Search, supra note 115.
117. Hua et al., Practice of Large-Scale AI, supra note 115, at 1.
118. City Brain: Empower Cities to Think with Data-Driven Governance,
CLOUD,
https://www.alibabacloud.com/et/city
ALIBABA
[https://perma.cc/QDA8-M4KM] (last visited Dec 19, 2019).
119. See Jess Young, A History of CCTV Surveillance in Britain, SWNS (Jan. 22,
2018),
https://stories.swns.com/news/history-cctv-surveillance-britain-93449/
[https://perma.cc/34KU-R8VM].
120. David Barrett, One Surveillance Camera for Every 11 People in Britain, Says
CCTV
Survey,
TELEGRAPH
(July
10,
2013),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/10172298/One-surveillance-camera-for-every
-11-people-in-Britain-says-CCTV-survey.html [https://perma.cc/SY8B-GK96].
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thousand video formats, poor quality footage and manual
processing.”121 The footage is used primarily as a tool for review by
specially trained police to use after an incident has already taken
place. “In the aftermath of the London riots in August 2011 police
scoured through more than 200,000 hours of CCTV to identify
suspects. Around 5,000 offenders were found by trawling through the
footage, after a process that took more than five months.”122 While
meaningful efforts to modernize, improve, and automate at least parts
of the United Kingdom’s dilapidated system are underway, the
process will be expensive and lengthy. As the United Kingdom
advances these efforts, it has already experienced pushback about the
use of facial recognition and biometric tracking information that the
CCTV network would need to become more automated and produce
data in real-time.123 In particular — with the details of the United
Kingdom’s post-Brexit relationship with Europe still to be worked
out — the United Kingdom’s use of these technologies will face
meaningful constraints in the form of the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which this Article will later
examine.124
City Brain’s public security functions are essentially trying to
recreate the efforts of the London police in 2011, but with
automation, programming City Brain to work in real-time, and even
make predictions. This level of surveillance may have already, or may
not, surpass that of regimes like Communist East Germany125 or,
indeed, Mao-era China.126 But even if it does not, City Brain efforts
offer massive advantages in terms of efficiency and precision. At the
time of its collapse, East Germany had more than 260,000 people, or

121. James Temperton, One Nation Under CCTV: The Future of Automated
Surveillance, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/one-nation-

under-cctv [https://perma.cc/NCR2-G8KY].
122. Id.
123. See Shannon Togawa Mercer & Ashley Deeks, ‘One Nation Under CCTV’:
The U.K. Tackles Facial Recognition Technology, LAWFARE (May 7, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/one-nation-under-cctv-uk-tackles-facial-recognition-tec
hnology [https://perma.cc/E4V4-MGFM].
124. See id.; see also infra Section III.B.
125. John Torpey, From Surveillance Communism to Surveillance Capitalism and
Beyond,
FORBES
(Nov.
8,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntorpey/2019/11/08/from-surveillance-communism-to
-surveillance-capitalism-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/TZ3K-7JLS].
126. Mao-era China involved exceptionally high levels of surveillance. See
Elizabeth Economy, China’s Neo-Maoist Moment, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-10-01/chinas-neo-maoist-moment
[https://perma.cc/P5SU-ZYWF].
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2% of its population, working full or part-time for its secret police.127
The comparable figure for the PRC would be approximately 28
million, about four times the number of civil servants currently
working in China.128 City Brain would seem to be able to provide a
similar level of surveillance at a tiny fraction of the cost. Additionally,
according to Alibaba’s researchers, the technology is both much
faster and much better at identifying people than a human; they claim
that the system was able to locate people in security footage from a
This
single photo, even if that photo was from behind.129
identification technology has many worthy applications, from
preventing terrorist attacks and mass shootings to finding missing
children. Nevertheless, the potential for an authoritarian regime that
could identify and track the comings and goings of every individual in
a city in real-time is staggering and perhaps not that far off. The
further the technology spreads beyond China, the more authoritarians
or potential authoritarians could have access to this surveillance of
unprecedented efficiency and effectiveness.
As with many smart cities or big data projects, City Brain collects
and stores large amounts of data on the cloud.130 The storage of such
large amounts of potentially sensitive data poses challenges — even
for companies in jurisdictions that are more concerned with data
security and privacy. But large Chinese technology companies’ lack
of concern with privacy, and their close relationship with the state,
make these concerns even more serious.131 Without a government
regulating the collection, storage, and protection of data and with
little fear of retribution from a state heavily invested in its success,
Alibaba — or any company in a similar position — has little reason to
take adequate measures to secure its data and systems. Even fairly
basic smart traffic control systems offer a prime target for hackers,132

127. Can Technology Plan Economies and Destroy Democracy?, ECONOMIST
(Dec.
18,
2019),
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129. See Hua et al., Practice of Large-Scale AI, supra note 115, at 10.
130. See id.
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Alibaba,
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(2019),
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[https://perma.cc/RC5V-KL3J].
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and as one of the most ambitious systems ever conceived, City Brian
provides an expansive attack surface area.
Concern that Alibaba and those that buy its smart cities products
will not take the security of its data seriously is more than theoretical.
In 2019, John Wethington of data security firm Condition:Black
discovered that a sizable Chinese smart city database was easily
accessible online, not even protected by a password.133 Although the
owner of the data was not explicit, it “made several references to the
tech giant’s artificial intelligence-powered cloud platform, City Brain,
but Alibaba later denied its platform was used.”134 When the content
of the database became clear, it not only raised concerns that such a
large and sensitive dataset was going unprotected but also revealed
the worrying scope of the data being collected and stored.
The unprotected data Wethington found was produced by the
continual monitoring of “residents around at least two small housing
communities in eastern Beijing, the largest of which is Liangmaqiao,
known as the city’s embassy district.”135 The data is collected through
various means, most notably cameras enabled with facial recognition
software. Using the data, it would be possible to construct a picture
of an individual’s coming and goings. It also identified the ethnicity
of individuals, a worrying prospect given China’s recent record of
targeting Muslims for repression,136 but also in many other
contexts.137 More concerning still, the data collected by cameras and
processed by facial recognition software was linked to government
records, including national identification card numbers and police
records.138 This clue also makes it likely that the Alibaba customer to
whom the data belonged was a Chinese local government.139 In a
similar breach in January 2020, City Brain data from the Chinese
cities of Luzhou and Hangzhou were uncovered.140
133. See Zack Whittaker, Security Lapse Exposed a Chinese Smart City
TECHCRUNCH
(May
3,
2019),
Surveillance
System,

https://techcrunch.com/2019/05/03/china-smart-city-exposed/
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136. See infra Section II.B.
137. See generally James Leibold, Surveillance in China’s Xinjiang Region: Ethnic
Sorting, Coercion, and Inducement, 29 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 46 (2020) (discussing the
surveillance of, and targeted repression against, Uyghur communities in the Xinjiang
region of China).
138. Whittaker, supra note 133.
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(Jan.
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Yet the worrying implications of City Brain’s public security
features and overall concerns about data collection and security are
easy to overlook in favor of the tremendous potential of its other
functions. Alibaba claims that its system is able to integrate data
from map tools, traffic police microblog accounts, and videos to
optimize traffic lights, taxi dispatch, and public transportation to
reduce traffic, improve emergency vehicle response times, and reduce
public transit delays.141 The system was purported to be highly
effective in its test city of Hangzhou, a major metropolis in China’s
silicon valley. After City Brain was given control of 104 traffic lights
in one district of the city, traffic was reduced by 15% in the first
year.142 Additionally, in Hangzhou, ambulance response times
dropped by 50%, and the accuracy of real-time traffic incident
detection reached 95%.143 In Shanghai, optimizing traffic light timing
dropped travel time by 8% and roadway congestion by 15%.144 Better
still for traffic-clogged metropolises, researchers claimed that in
Suzhou, in Jiangsu Province, “dynamic adjustment of bus departure
time increased the number of people taking buses by 17%.”145 If
these kinds of improvements are substantiated and reproducible in
other contexts, cities around the world will and should be clamoring
to get their own City Brains.
While the scope and scale of City Brain are impressive, it is the
possibility for the rapid spread of the system that makes it perhaps
the most important smart cities technology on the planet. A system
that provides cities some relief from congestion without major
infrastructure spending could be incredibly tempting even for a
wealthy democracy that takes transparency and data privacy
seriously. For the rapidly growing and increasingly congested cities of
the developing world (the four cities with the world’s worst traffic are
Mumbai, Bogota, Lima, and New Delhi),146 many of which have
limited legal and democratic constrains, the appeal of City Brain may
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be irresistible. City Brain is already being deployed in cities across
China, including Xiong’an New Area (near Beijing and Tianjin),
Chongqing, Macau, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Suzhou.147
Beyond China, Malaysia’s capital, Kuala Lumpur, has already signed
a contract to implement City Brain,148 and if things go according to
plan, this will be only the tip of the iceberg. Alibaba claims it “is
already working with 120,000 developers and 2700 academic institutes
and businesses from 77 countries and regions.”149
Utility notwithstanding, there are good reasons to believe that the
Chinese state can and will take advantage of the incredible data
gathering power of City Brain. According to Christopher Ashley
Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and
Non-Proliferation at the United States Department of State:
Firms such as Huawei, Tencent, ZTE, Alibaba, and Baidu have no
meaningful ability to tell the Chinese Communist Party “no” if
officials decide to ask for their assistance . . . . Such aid may not
necessarily occur routinely, but it certainly can occur — and
presumably will — whenever the Party considers this useful and
cares to demand it.150

That the Chinese state will be able to use City Brain and similar
technologies to help it monitor and control its citizens, therefore, is a
virtual certainty. Yet, as City Brain spreads to cities across the globe,
it is possible that the Chinese state will use its influence on Alibaba
and other companies to gain an equal level of access in any and every
city that implements Chinese smart city technology. This fear echoes
and amplifies the existing concerns about the spread of Huawei’s 5G
technology, which are considered below.151
Further legitimate fears arise from concerns that as this technology
spreads, City Brain-like systems might be built and controlled by
purely private interests. In the words of John Wethington:
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[I]t’s not difficult to imagine the potential for abuse that would exist
if a platform like this were brought to the U.S. with no civilian and
governmental regulations or oversight . . . while businesses cannot
simply plug in to FBI data sets today it would not be hard for them
to access other state or local criminal databases and begin to create
their own profiles on customers or adversaries.152

The potential for the private use and abuse of this data could be
even greater in developing nations where governments would have
less technical and regulatory ability or inclination to pushback against
wealthy and powerful companies, most of which would be based in
other countries.
B. Monitoring Muslims

China’s Western provinces, especially Xinjiang, have long been
areas discontented with PRC rule, which is both a cause and a result
of repression against Muslim minorities.153 The region has a long but
troubled relationship with Beijing, with the Qing and subsequent
Republican governments often only loosely controlling the region.154
This culminated in a strong nationalist movement and even a brief
period of independence in the 1930s and 1940s.155 Since the rise of
the PRC, however, Beijing has exerted increasingly tighter control
over the region.156 After 9/11, the PRC used the threat of Islamic
terrorism to justify its repression, yet most of the discontent has
surfaced in the form of ethnic riots, such as a major outbreak in the
summer of 2009.157
The repression has stepped up since 2017, with at least 800,000
Muslims being detained in “re-education” camps.158 In some ways,

152. Whittaker, supra note 133.
153. See James Griffiths, China’s Paranoia and Oppression in Xinjiang has a Long
History,
CNN
(Oct.
13,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/11/asia/xinjiang-reeducation-muslim-china-intl/index.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/T79W-J4S5]. See also generally R. Harris, Repression and Quiet
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this is just a particularly extreme phase in ongoing cycles of
repression. In 2010, for example, Beijing essentially turned off the
internet in Xinjiang for ten months.159 What makes this round of
repression different and important for considering the future of smart
cities is that the detentions and repression seem to be quietly
supported by a sophisticated and massive effort to use data collection
to target and sustain it.
In early 2018, Human Rights Watch (HRW), an international
NGO, downloaded a smartphone application designed for use by
Chinese officials in Xinjiang. The application is part of China’s
Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), an overarching system
of mass surveillance in Xinjiang, and seems to have been created by a
major Chinese military contractor. The goal of this effort seems to be
an unprecedented level of surveillance and control of everyone in the
province. Working with a Berlin-based security company to decipher
and reverse engineer the application, HRW was able to assemble a
picture of a remarkably data-intensive program of mass surveillance
underway in Xinjiang.160
The IJOP, in large part, appears to be an effort to assemble every
piece of information the government can learn about residents of
Xinjiang, but what makes it so unprecedented is the overwhelming
number of data sources the application can draw on.161 Starting in
2017, authorities in Xinjiang began collecting biometrics, including
DNA samples, fingerprints, iris scans, and blood types of all residents
in the region between the ages of 12 and 65.162 Additional
information collected includes height, religious dress, beard length,
electricity and gas usage, package deliveries, use of a home’s back
be to de-radicalize, Sinicize, and generally compel Chinese Muslims (especially from
the Uighur ethnic group) to accept Beijing’s rule.
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versus the front door, movements around cities and the province,
police records, addresses, vehicle registration, as well as details on
trips abroad.163
The breadth of the data collected is even more staggering once the
detail of the information becomes clear. Information on packages,
for example, includes not only basic information on the sender,
intended recipient, and delivery company but also includes who
received the package upon delivery, the date and time, X-rays, and
photos of it.164 Information on gas and electricity usage is presumably
drawn from utility companies and financial information from banks,
both of which are partially — if not completely — state-owned.165
Information on the sending and delivery of packages is added and
must come, at least in part, from private delivery companies.
Cameras equipped with facial recognition, cross-referenced with
existing government biometric data, provide much of the most
important information on a person’s comings and goings.166 Physical
checkpoints have been set up all over Xinjiang to check IDs, often in
conjunction with facial recognition. Additionally, these checkpoints
seem to have been quietly equipped with “data doors,” special
machines that detect and log the MAC addresses and IMEI numbers
of any phones that pass through the checkpoint.167 Similarly, the
IJOP application seems to pick up and log wireless signals and their
security features (a process called “wardriving”).168 While this level
of data collection would certainly be ripe for a legal challenge
elsewhere, even in China, it seems likely that the IJOP violates
relatively limited restrictions on state surveillance.169 Yet, mounting a
legal or political challenge to the system would almost certainly be
both dangerous and futile. While many actions of the local Chinese

163. WANG, supra note 161, at 17.
164. Id.
165. See XIAOTING ZHENG ET AL., PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: DO PRIVATE
WATER
UTILITIES
OUTPERFORM
STATE-RUN
UTILITIES?
iv
(2016),
https://www.adb.org/publications/prc-private-water-utilities-outperform-state-run-util
ities [https://perma.cc/UW3E-XK47]; Matthew Miller, China’s Banks Embrace
Communist Party Committees in Risk Crackdown, REUTERS (June 27, 2018, 1:48
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-banks-party-idUSKBN1JN0XN
[https://perma.cc/U8XD-CPQ9].
166. WANG, supra note 161.
167. Id.
168. Benjamin D. Kern, Whacking, Joyriding and War-Driving: Roaming Use of
Wi-Fi and the Law, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 104 n.7
(2004).
169. WANG, supra note 161.
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state can successfully and safely be challenged in court,170 more
politically sensitive cases, especially those relating to ethnic
minorities, are beyond the pale. Taking such a case to court could
lead to a wide variety of repressive responses from the state against
both plaintiffs and their lawyers, including criminal prosecution.171
Once assembled, the information collected by the IJOP is used to
identify “suspicious” individuals or situations.172 Given the incredible
breadth and depth of data available to it, the IJOP is surprisingly
mechanistic in determining which individuals or situations are worthy
of further scrutiny.173 Instead of the big-data-worthy algorithms we
might expect, the application seems to use “simple conditional
statements — if a, then b (for example, if the person who drives the
car is not the same as the person to whom the car is registered, then
investigate this person).”174 Having identified a person or situation
for further review, the application then prompts low-level local
officials to investigate. A pair of mock examples from HRW’s
reverse engineering of the application provides a sense of how the
application is meant to function. The first example shows the extent
to which investigations are prompted purely by when and where
people are picked up by automated surveillance, such as facial
recognition systems and data doors. This seems to work in
combination with conclusions drawn from algorithms that glean
characteristics like ethnicity and religiosity based on personal
appearance: “suspicious person Zhang San, whose address is Xinjiang
Urumqi, ID number 653222198502043265, phone number
18965983265. That person has repeatedly appeared in inappropriate
locations, and he displays [or his clothing shows] strong
religiousness.” A second example shows how the application prompts
officials to collect more data: “Suspicious person Maimaiti Muhemuti,
who originally lives in Xinjiang’s Urumqi, ID number
170. See generally John Wagner Givens, Sleeping with Dragons? Politically
Embedded Lawyers Suing the Chinese State, 31 WIS. INT’L L.J. 101 (2013).
171. AMNESTY INT’L, AGAINST THE LAW: CRACKDOWN ON CHINA’S HUMAN
RIGHTS
LAWYERS
DEEPENS
3
(2011),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/28000/asa170182011en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6U9P-BSVZ]; China: Torture and Forced Confessions Rampant
amid Systematic Trampling of Lawyers’ Rights, AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 12, 2015),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/11/china-torture-forced-confession/
[https://perma.cc/M2R7-8A59]; Jonathan Kinkel & William Hurst, Review Essay —

Access to Justice in Post-Mao China: Assessing the Politics of Criminal and
Administrative Law, 11 J. EAST ASIAN STUD. 467, 478 (2011).
172. WANG, supra note 161.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 19.

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

862

[Vol. XLVII

653222198502043215, phone number 13803021458. Report time:
2017-09-25 14:01:53 [Mission] text: Please carefully investigate
whether he still lives in Urumqi and investigate his family
situation.”175 While this overall program of mass surveillance is
overseen by the Public Security Bureau (the local police), personnel
from other government agencies, state-owned enterprises, and public
institutions have also been used to surveil people.176 Surveillance
may also include extended home visits,177 which in 2017 amounted to
an attempt to put one million government officials in the homes of
Xinjiang residents.178
Visits by the prompted officials are meant to produce yet more
information, which seems to be the main purpose of the IJOP
application.179 Officials are urged to add varied information to the
IJOP through the application, from text and drop-down menus to
audio and photos.180 The investigation can also include “a phone
search for software, network tools, or content that is problematic.”181
Fifty-one network tools are flagged as suspicious, including tools for
circumventing online censorship, such as Virtual Private Networks
(VPNs), and apps that allow for encrypted communication, like
WhatsApp and Viber.182 The surveillance does not end with the
targeted minorities.
The app also scores government officials on their performance in
fulfilling tasks and is a tool for higher-level supervisors to assign
tasks to, and keep tabs on the performance of, lower-level officials.
The IJOP application, in part, aims to control government officials
to ensure that they are efficiently carrying out the government’s
repressive orders.183

175. Id. at 29.
176. Id. at 18.
177. China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region, HUM. RTS.
WATCH
(May
13,
2018),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-re
gion [https://perma.cc/H9PT-PMCD].
178. Xinjiang Qidong Minzu Tuanjie “Jieqin Zhou” Baiwan Ganbu Zhigong Fenpi
Xia Jiceng (新疆启动民族团结“结亲周”百万干部职工分批下基层), ZHONGYANG
TONGZHANBU WANGZHAN (中共中央统一战线工作部) (Dec. 19, 2017),
http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/S1824/201712/029ea48103254b359c754152e005c302.s
html [https://perma.cc/2HYM-TMH2].
179. WANG, supra note 161.
180. Id.
181. Nazish & Maya, supra note 160.
182. WANG, supra note 161, at 2.
183. Id. at 3.
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While IJOP is likely to stay limited to Xinjiang or perhaps other
minority-heavy areas of China, for the time being, the authoritarian
possibilities its example hints at are terrifyingly Orwellian.
C. Social Credit System

Although it is currently only peripherally related to core smart city
functions and extensively covered in both popular and academic
publications, no discussion about data security in the PRC could be
complete without a brief mention of China’s rapidly expanding social
credit systems (SCS). The “Planning Outline for the Construction of
a Social Credit System,” released in 2014 by the State Council (the
PRC’s chief administrative authority), provides an authoritative
direction on what the PRC seeks to accomplish with SCS.184
[The plan] focused on the creation of the underlying information
infrastructure that would be required for the system’s successful
rollout. It systematically provided for standardized means to record
credit-related information in different sections of the administration,
databases to store this information at the central and local levels, the
establishment of credit reporting mechanisms to enable public
access to the information, as well as information sharing processes in
order to counter the siloing of data within the bureaucracy.185

This data is then used to implement a system of rewards and
punishments implemented with implications for interactions with
both the state and the market. Black (bad) and red (good) lists would
be created to punish and reward people.186 Being on the blacklist
could result in serious consequences for an individual, and even their
family who might find themselves “unable to purchase high-speed
train tickets, fly on an airplane, or send [their] kids to a private
school.”187 Despite assertions to the contrary, especially in the
popular press, what does not seem to be present in the creation of the
SCS are the types of big data algorithmic analyses that are at work in
the City Brain project.188 Essentially, the SCS appears to be a far
broader and more authoritarian use of the types of credit rating

184. Rogier Creemers, China’s Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of
Control 13 (May 22, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Leiden University),
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3175792 [https://perma.cc/2Q64-GXZB].
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Louise Matsakis, How the West Got China’s Social Credit System Wrong,
WIRED (July 29, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/china-social-credit-score-system/
[https://perma.cc/DY2D-AA8Q].
188. Creemers, supra note 184, at 13, 22.
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systems that are already common in wealthy democracies.189 Aside
from substantial data collection, therefore, the applicability and
comparability of the SCS to smart cities are relatively small.
The evidence suggests that rather than finding SCSs to be a
dystopian violation of personal privacy as they are invariably
conceived of in Western media, they are extremely popular among
average Chinese. Evidence from a 2018 cross-regional online survey
by Genia Kosta of the Freie Universität Berlin found remarkably
high levels of support for social credit systems. While 48.9% of
respondents said they strongly approved of the schemes and 31.1%
said they somewhat approved, less than 1.5% said they disapproved of
such schemes. Older, male, higher-income, more educated, and
urban respondents showed higher levels of support.190 These findings
may seem surprising, but supplementary “interviews show that
citizens perceive SCSs not as an instrument of surveillance, but as an
instrument to improve the quality of life and to close institutional and
regulatory gaps, leading to more honest and law-abiding behavior in
society.”191
The difference between public perception of the SCS in China and
its depiction in the Western media can largely be explained by the
remarkably high levels of trust that Chinese people have in their
state. According to Edelman, the world’s biggest public relations firm
by revenue, the Chinese have the highest level of trust in their
government of the 26 countries they surveyed, with a score of 86 out
of 100.192 Other empirical work has long shown high levels of trust
and support for the Chinese state.193 This explanation is borne out by
other findings of the survey; 77% of respondents expected the central
government to be the most responsible user of personal data.
Provincial (48%) and municipal governments (42%) were also seen as
relatively trustworthy, and even state-owned companies (27%) were

189. Christopher Curley, Many Countries Don’t Use Credit Scores Like the US —
Here’s How They Determine Your Worth, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 20, 2018),

https://www.businessinsider.com/credit-score-around-the-world-2018-8
[https://perma.cc/B72D-NL3Q].
190. Genia Kostka, China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining
High Levels of Approval, 21 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1565, 1588 (2019).
191. Id.
192. EDELMAN, 2019 EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER: GLOBAL REPORT 41 (2019),
https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2019-02/2019_Edelman_Trust_B
arometer_Global_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EUB-QBFD].
193. See generally Lingnan He & Dali L. Yang, The Enigma of Political Trust in
China, 15 TAIWAN J. DEMOCRACY 87 (2019).
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viewed as far more trustworthy than private companies (8%).194 The
conclusion, yet again, seems to be that, to date, average Chinese are
comparatively comfortable with the collection, analysis, and use of
data, especially when controlled by the state.
D. Other Applications of Facial Recognition Technology

While the other applications of smart city-related technology
explored in this Section are large-scale projects, a few smaller
examples of uses of facial recognition technology in China help us
understand how far down the path to ubiquity important surveillance
technology has traveled. The examples also give color to how
unconcerned the state and even private companies are with uses of
technology that many citizens of democracies might see as Orwellian.
China has slowly been rolling out new anti-jaywalking systems that
use cameras, LED screens, and facial recognition to identify, fine, and
shame jaywalkers. At very busy intersections, cameras on traffic
lights take pictures of jaywalkers, use facial-recognition software to
identify them, and subsequently issue them fines as well as post their
pictures and identifying details on screens mounted on the traffic
lights.195 The technology amusingly misfired when it named a
well-known Chinese businesswoman, Dong Mingzhu, as a jaywalker
after recognizing her photograph from an advertisement on the side
of a bus.196 Furthermore, in a pilot program at a public toilet in
Beijing, facial recognition is used to combat toilet paper thieves by
dispensing only two feet of toilet paper to any given person within
nine minutes.197
Chinese have little choice but to consent to systems like the
anti-jaywalking traffic lights, though they could attempt to disguise
their faces when they cross. Yet, even when given a choice, the
average Chinese seem relatively willing to “opt-in” to facial
recognition even when the payoff seems vanishingly low. In some
Chinese airports, terminals offer the minor convenience of allowing
194. Kostka, supra note 190, at 1587–88.
195. Liu Zhen, Shanghai Introduces Facial Recognition to Halt Jaywalkers, S.
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(July
3,
2017),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2101061/shanghai-adopts-facial-reco
gnition-system-name-shame-jaywalkers [https://perma.cc/F9MN-DYE8].
196. Chinese AI Caught Out by Face in Bus Ad, BBC (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-46357004 [https://perma.cc/5ZDB-CZXR].
197. Javier C. Hernández, China’s High-Tech Tool to Fight Toilet Paper Bandits,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
20,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/world/asia/china-toilet-paper-theft.html
[https://perma.cc/DMC3-42DX].
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travelers to check their flight details by presenting their face to a
camera equipped with facial recognition software.198 Some of KFC’s
6000 outlets in China199 have even experimented with facial
recognition systems for ordering food, and though the idea does not
seem to have taken off, it also did not seem to spark any serious
resistance.200 Facial recognition-based payment systems, however,
are quickly gaining popularity. In Henan’s capital of Zhengzhou,
nearly 200,000 commuters opted to authorize facial recognition-based
payments to use the local subway.201
There does seem to be a limit, however, on the uses of facial
recognition that average Chinese citizens, or at least netizens, will
tolerate. For example, in January 2020,
the urban management department of Suzhou, a city of six million
people in Anhui Province, sparked outrage online when it published
surveillance photos taken by street cameras of seven residents
wearing pajamas in public along with parts of their names,
government identification numbers and the locations where their
“uncivilized behavior” had taken place.202

While the government’s battle against public pajamas and other
“uncivilized behavior” has been an ongoing issue for over a decade in
China, this use of facial recognition quickly attracted national
criticism and caused Suzhou officials to apologize.
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E. Lessons from the Chinese Case

While the technologies and applications assessed in these cases are
very different, each of them is essentially about the collection and use
of data that, at least in theory, can be applied to smart cities. It
should be immediately evident that many of these examples fall afoul
of Edwards’ key security issues.203 None of the systems explored
above, with perhaps the minor exception of the airport facial
recognition system, provide any meaningful opportunity for opting
out or providing consent. All these systems, but especially City Brain
and the IJOP, create privately-held data linked specifically to
individuals from “public” interactions that are as simple as walking
down the street, making it very different than London’s CTV security
footage. All the systems seem to involve private contractors who may
have access to the data, though admittedly a lack of information and
transparency makes this issue difficult to assess fully. Much of the
data fed into these systems, especially City Brain, is repurposed from
the Internet of Things.204 Finally, as was vividly demonstrated by
Wethington, once collected data is stored on the cloud, little thought
is given to its security.
Beyond these clear failures to solve or even engage with privacy
challenges, there are common themes that emerge from China’s
projects, which help inform our comparison with wealthy
democracies. First, there is little concern on almost any level about
what data is collected, how it is stored, for how long, and who has
access to it. Second, while wealthy democracies wring their hands
about privacy and other issues,205 China and its private sector are
powering ahead and at a staggering rate. Third, there is little
transparency about how any of these projects or technologies are
advancing; this is unsurprising given that there seems to be relatively
little demand for transparency from political or legal systems or even
public opinion. Fourth, the amount of data being collected and used
in these projects is staggering. With the vital exception of City Brain,
however, there seems to be a lack of the big data analytical
techniques and sophisticated algorithms of the kind we might expect
and indeed has sometimes been (mis)reported. It is possible that this

203. See supra Section I.D.
204. See WANG, supra note 161; Hua et al., Practice of Large-Scale AI, supra note
115.
205. Hannah Williams, Why the UK Is Playing Catch up with China in the Smart
City
Race,
COMPUTERWORLD
(Nov.
12,
2019),
https://www.computerworld.com/article/3453024/why-the-uk-is-playing-catch-up-with
-china-in-the-smart-city-race.html [https://perma.cc/BJ3Z-7WYM].
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more sophisticated analysis is coming, perhaps as part of the
expansion of City Brain. But it is also possible that given the level of
data available and the applicable goals, more sophisticated analysis is
simply unnecessary. Google, Facebook, and Amazon may need
cutting edge data analytics to help fill in the blanks about user age,
gender, religion, marital and family status, and other attributes. Still,
the Chinese State will already know any one of these data points as a
certainty. Lastly, average Chinese, with the notable exception of
targeted minority groups, are generally willing to accept obviously
authoritarian uses of the PRC’s rapidly increasing data collection.
Chinese appear to overwhelmingly support a social credit system that
is universally disparaged abroad.206 They are apparently willing to
accept facial recognition even for the minor convenience of paying
subway fare or getting their flight information. This may seem
surprising in the West, and yet it makes sense given the high level of
trust most citizens have in the Chinese state. Given, however, that
this trust is largely built on the state’s record of overseeing the largest
and most dramatic spurt of development in human history
(performance legitimacy)207 and that trust in government usually
suffers during a downturn (performance theory),208 it is likely that
trust in the state would suffer from a serious economic downturn.
While the details of how and when this might happen are unclear, the
possibility concerns the Chinese state and may be one of the reasons
for its ramping up of surveillance and other repressive capacities.
Before indulging in dystopian speculation about the depth and
power of China’s digital authoritarianism, it is important to have
some reasonable perspective. On a trip to Shanghai in May 2019, one
of this Article’s authors could not help but notice that people paid
little attention to face recognition-equipped traffic lights. Instead, a
much more obvious conflict was going on between Shanghai’s police
and residents being ticketed for unregistered electric scooters or
riding bicycles on the sidewalk. These conflicts could be seen played
out all over Shanghai, but always in person and often with long,
drawn-out arguments between the public security officers and people

206. See generally Kostka, supra note 190.
207. See generally Hongxing Yang & Dingxin Zhao, Performance Legitimacy,
State Autonomy and China’s Economic Miracle, 24 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 64 (2015).
See also Yuchao Zhu, “Performance Legitimacy” and China’s Political Adaptation
Strategy, 16 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 123 (2011).
208. See generally Yunsoo Lee, The Great Recession, Government Performance,
and Citizen Trust, 25 J. INT’L & AREA STUD. 57 (2018).
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being fined.209 What is more, the e-scooter crackdown seems to
extend only to a handful of China’s largest cities.210 Within smaller,
less-developed cities, these types of violations still generally go almost
completely unnoticed. The PRC’s dreams of complete surveillance
and control are vast,211 and the progress is rapid, but in many areas,
state capacity and the monitoring and control of society still lags what
is common in wealthy democracies.212 In the contemporary PRC,
policing society still happens face to face.
III. DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES TO THE CHINA MODEL

In this Article, we argue that China’s rapid advancement in smart
cities technology should be a wakeup call to democracies. But the
fact that it has forged ahead so quickly also means that the China
Model offers vivid examples that other democracies can learn from —
although in most cases, China provides an example that democracies
should avoid, rather than follow. This Part contrasts the Chinese
example with the development of smart city technology in wealthy
democracies. In particular, we examine the potential role of
surveillance intermediaries and consider the role of Europe’s data
privacy law and potential U.S. parallels. Further, we evaluate if and
how wealthy democracies can compete with Chinese smart city
technology. Finally, we consider what China’s rapid advancement in
smart cities and democracies’ lagging response means in the rest of
the world.
China’s smart city technologies offer almost no transparency or
consent in terms of the collection, use, or storage of data.
Additionally, when asked, private companies will not resist the

209. Wu Linhua (邬林桦), Shanghai Jingfang Zaici Kaizhan Quanshi Jizhong Daji
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(Apr.
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2019),
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TIME
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state.213 Samantha Hoffman, a visiting academic fellow at the
Mercator Institute for China Studies, explained that “Under [China’s]
Cyber Security Law, the personal data a company collects can be
protected from misuse by the company . . . that same data, however, is
not protected from the government. This isn’t contradictory in
Chinese law, even if it is according to Western norms.”214 In short,
China can serve as a vivid demonstration of a system in which the
state and private companies fail to check one another in the collection
and use of data.
Another serious issue in China is the lack of choice between
companies that may collect personal information. In no small part,
this is due to a close collaboration between the private sector and the
state. Private companies like Huawei and Alibaba maintain and
value close relationships with the state; other technology companies,
including all cellular network providers, are state-owned.
Additionally, foreign competitors that might offer a more
privacy-friendly alternative are censored or banned from certain
sectors.215
Democracies advancing smart cities technology should ensure they
give their citizens more choice. Many applications of smart cities
technology make use of public data in some way. That said, it is
difficult for even a relatively educated and wealthy consumer who
cares a great deal about data privacy to move away from a jurisdiction
with weak privacy protections to one that takes data security more
seriously. By contrast, shifting between providers of other types of
products involved in collecting and using smart cities data could be
much easier. In many cases, consumers can shift between ride-hailing
apps, smartphone makers, internet providers, and other service
providers in a few minutes and at no cost. One lesson for smart city
designers, therefore, could be to ensure that consumers and residents
are provided as much choice as possible when using private or
third-party products to interact with smart city infrastructure.
A. Surveillance Intermediaries

Because of the high technological bar and investment needed for
large scale smart cities projects, it is probable that nearly all will
213. Lucas, supra note 131; William Yang, How Much Do Chinese People Care
Privacy?,
DEUTSCHE
WELLE
(Apr.
12,
2018),
https://www.dw.com/en/how-much-do-chinese-people-care-about-privacy/a-43358120
[https://perma.cc/U6BX-M8WD].
214. Yang, supra note 213.
215. Leskin, supra note 91.
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involve private partners. As we have seen in the Chinese case, this
can create potential problems and an added layer of complexity when
trying to protect privacy. Yet, we argue it could also create
opportunities for helping to protect data and privacy better and limit
the abuse of smart cities technology.
Tech companies in wealthy democracies could play a vital role in
protecting personal data from the state. In part, this could and should
be a result of legal restrictions that prevent companies from
collecting, keeping, or sharing certain kinds of data. But market
incentives can also induce companies to take privacy more seriously.
Companies can create significant value for their brands by cultivating
a reputation for keeping its customers’ data secure. While most
consumers are probably more worried about malicious actors,
evidence that a company can and will protect data from the state can
be important to many, from small-government conservatives in the
United States to citizens of developing countries with worrisome
records on civil liberties. Imagine if customers in Russia, Kazakhstan,
Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela, or Iran had a choice between Chinese
technology they could be relatively sure would allow the state access
to their data, and a company based in a democracy with strict data
privacy protection, which consumers could be relatively sure would
do its best to pushback against state snooping. This possibility is not
theoretical: in repeatedly and very publicly refusing to unlock iPhones
for the American federal government, Apple has proven both the
strength of its encryption and the depth of its commitment to privacy
protection. The volume, and more importantly, the nature of the
publicity that this incident generated for Apple could not be bought
at any price.216
Current U.S. law and the policies of big tech firms seriously limit
the extent to which technology firms can push back against
government requests for data. The third-party doctrine, as applied in
United States v. Miller217 and Smith v. Maryland,218 holds that
voluntarily providing information to a third party forfeits any privacy
interest in that information.219 The inability of private companies to
216. See generally Amitai Etzioni, Apple: Good Business, Poor Citizen?, 151 J.
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push back against U.S. law enforcement is evidenced by the
remarkable quantity of data major technology companies provide to
the government. By 2019, “Facebook said it produced data for 88%
of U.S. government requests, and that a majority of them, 47,457,
were under the ‘legal process’ category that includes search warrants,
subpoenas and court orders.”220 These requests extend to a large
number of technology companies and have been rising
dramatically.221
Existing jurisprudence also helps point towards possible legal
solutions to how to protect personal data better. For example, United
States v. Jones raised the possibility of a constitutional difference
between short- and long-term surveillance.222 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Samuel Alito wrote:
Under this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy
that our society has recognized as reasonable. But the use of longer
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy.223

Justice Sotomayor’s separate concurring opinion picked up on
similar themes.224 Years later, the implications of IoT enabled
surveillance and just how far long term and even retroactive
surveillance could be taken were addressed in Carpenter v. United
States. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts opined:
With access to CSLI [cell site location information], the
Government can now travel back in time to retrace a person’s
whereabouts, subject only to the retention polices [sic] of the
wireless carriers, which currently maintain records for up to five
years. Critically, because location information is continually logged
for all of the 400 million devices in the United States — not just
those belonging to persons who might happen to come under
investigation — this newfound tracking capacity runs against
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everyone. Unlike with the GPS device in Jones, police need not
even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular
individual, or when. Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has
effectively been tailed every moment of every day for five years, and
the police may — in the Government’s view — call upon the results
of that surveillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment. Only the few without cell phones could escape this
tireless and absolute surveillance.225

Companies can and should create more streamlined systems that
collect less data, anonymize it, or delete it more quickly. Currently,
American mobile providers store customers’ location data collected
for between one year (Verizon) and seven years (AT&T).226 There
seems little justification for keeping this data, especially
un-anonymized, other than selling it to third parties, which has come
under congressional and popular scrutiny.227 Strong legal restrictions
on both selling data and keeping it for extended periods would help
companies resist state demands for data. Companies cannot be made
to produce data they never collected, no longer have, or cannot link
to specific individuals.
Building on the logic established in Jones and Carpenter, the
United States could structure its data privacy around a short- versus
long-term distinction. Personal data could be used to optimize traffic,
emergency response routes, public transit, and a wide variety of other
city services, but could be legally required to be deleted within hours
or even minutes.
If the United States is to become an exemplar of data privacy to be
emulated and to disperse high standards along with its smart cities
technology globally, it will need newer, smarter, and tougher laws. In
this regard, the European Union is already far ahead of the United
States. In the next Section, we examine a case that shows how
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) can and has
empowered surveillance intermediaries to push back against the local
state. We will also show how California’s new privacy law is bringing
the United States into line with these same standards.
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B. Europe

Thanks to the GDPR, the European Union, composed of nearly 30
sovereign nations, can be seen as having a more comprehensive,
coherent, and consistent privacy policy than the United States.228
There are several reasons for this. In part, it is the result of the strong
federal nature of the United States, which has also hurt advancements
in other areas of innovation that generally benefit from strong
government support. For example, policy fragmentation and lack of
clear national leadership were two of the reasons that the United
States was surpassed by the PRC and the European Union in the
development of renewable energy, where a “patchwork of state-level
approaches creates complexity, instills uncertainty, and inhibits
opportunities to optimize resource allocation.”229
Yet the U.S. federal structure also offers opportunities for specific
jurisdictions, especially populous ones, to lead the way by setting
higher standards than the federal government or other states.
Sometimes this is merely states fulfilling their roles as “laboratories of
democracy.”230 When a state or city sets a higher minimum wage, it
provides an example that other states or the federal government may
or may not choose to emulate.231 But when a particularly populous
state sets strict standards that certain products must meet, companies
often choose to meet this higher standard with products offered
throughout the United States or even the world. For example,
California’s emissions and fuel standards for automobiles are
“benchmarks set in the Golden State [that] ripple through the rest of
the country and can even shape the global market.”232 For this

228. Tony Romm et al., Europe, Not the U.S., Is Now the Most Powerful
WASH.
POST
(May
25,
2018),
of
Silicon
Valley,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/europe-not-the-us-is-now-themost-powerful-regulator-of-silicon-valley/2018/05/25/f7dfb600-604f-11e8-8c93-8cf33c2
1da8d_story.html [https://perma.cc/BFV2-D454].
229. Kelly Sims Gallagher, Why & How Governments Support Renewable Energy,
142 DAEDALUS 59, 73 (2013).
230. G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and
Scientific Management, 31 PUBLIUS 37, 40–41 (2001).
231. See Andrew Branch, Wages of Federalism, WORLD MAG. (Feb. 21, 2014),
https://world.wng.org/2014/02/wages_of_federalism [https://perma.cc/X4KL-X6GW];
Matthew Zeitlin, Seattle’s Minimum Wage Was the Highest in the Nation. Here’s
VOX
(July
22,
2019),
What
Happened.,
https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/7/13/20690266/seattle-minimum-wage-15-doll
ars [https://perma.cc/Z9G5-JW32].
232. Umair Irfan, Trump’s Fight with California over Vehicle Emissions Rules Has
Divided
Automakers,
VOX
(Nov.
5,
2019),

Regulator

2020]

SMARTER CITIES OR BIGGER BROTHER? 875

reason, the best hope for near-term improvements in privacy
regulations in the United States comes in the form of the California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), the strictest privacy law in the
United States, which came into effect in January 2020.233 The CCPA
will have a nation-wide, and to a lesser extent, global impact not only
because of California’s large population and lucrative markets but
because over half of the United States’ and over a quarter of the
world’s 20 largest tech companies are headquartered in California.234
The CCPA will set the de facto national standard for privacy for
the foreseeable future. It will, therefore, begin to bring the United
States into line with the privacy principles enshrined in Europe’s
GDPR. More specifically, those principals are lawfulness, fairness,
and transparency; purpose limitation; data minimization; accuracy;
storage limitation; integrity and confidentiality (security); and
accountability.235 Taken together as the standard for Europe and the
de facto standard for the United States, the GDPR and CCPA could
give companies in wealthy democracies a relatively clear global
standard. When combined, the United States and the European
Union represent a market of around 800 million people and a GDP
that is still far larger than the PRC’s. This could give companies
developing smart cities technologies in wealthy democracies a market
big enough for them to compete with Chinese companies.
Additionally, Chinese companies will need to meet these same
standards, at least in the United States and European Union, lest they
forgo many of the world’s largest markets. In order to capitalize on
these opportunities, efforts should be taken to harmonize the privacy
regimes among democracies as much as possible.
While the impact of the CCPA is still uncertain, the GDPR, which
has applied since May 25, 2018, has already had a substantial
impact.236 The idea that private service providers might push back
against government overreach with smart cities data might initially
seem optimistic, yet this is exactly what the GDPR has helped some
surveillance intermediaries to do. Brøndby IF, a football club based
in the outskirts of Copenhagen, uses facial recognition software to
prevent known troublemakers from attending matches in the team’s
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stadium.237
Brøndby’s system marks one of the first private
large-scale uses of facial recognition software after the GDPR came
into effect.238 In compliance with the GDPR, the facial recognition
system is used to enter those from the watchlist into the system only
on game day and is deleted at the end of the day. The system is kept
separate from the internet, and a cross-check is used to avoid false
positives.239
The value of strict data privacy laws being passed and enforced on
private systems and the contrast with the Chinese case examined
above should be clear. Less clear is the extent to which such laws
could and should enable private companies to push back against
possible overreach from other parts of the state. Mickel Lauritsen,
Brøndby’s security chief, says that local police have asked him to use
the team’s facial recognition system to assist in an investigation, but
that he was obligated to refuse by the terms of their regulatory
permission.240 There are signs that these clear rules, when strictly
enforced, facilitate public trust. In the words of one football fan,
“You can’t do anything in Denmark without getting the proper
approval. So it’s not being misused, I don’t think. You can’t do that
in Denmark.”241
An arrangement like the strict European approach to privacy,
however, may be difficult or impossible to replicate in the United
States. For one thing, it is relatively easy for Europe to be strict or
even punitive against technology companies in both legislation and
enforcement because none of the world’s largest tech companies are
based in Europe. Yet the CCPA should provide some hope here as
well: if California can move to reign in its large tech firms like Apple,
Alphabet, and Facebook, perhaps the rest of the country will be
willing to follow. Nevertheless, even if the legislation and tough
enforcement prove forthcoming, it is not clear that public opinion will
follow. China and most governments in Europe, especially Northern
Europe, have long enjoyed higher levels of trust among their
people.242 This is unlikely to be easy or fast to reproduce in the U.S.
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context and is another reason that more market-based solutions to
data privacy issues might be a more practical choice in the United
States.
C. Can Democracies Compete with the PRC’s Smart City
Technology?

In this Article, we argue that wealthy democracies must push
forward with the development of smart cities for two reasons. First,
smart cities can provide meaningful benefits not only to the residents
of wealthy democracies, such as in improving traffic but also to the
world, like combatting climate change.
Second, if wealthy
democracies and their corporations do not offer the world smart cities
technologies that allow for some measure of privacy, democracy, and
personal freedom, then non-democratic countries and their
corporations will offer them smart cities technologies that do less to
address these concerns.
The idea that China could beat out wealthy democracies in smart
cities technology has a strong precedent. The most relevant example
is the current state of and debates about 5G technology and its
deployment around the globe.243 Beginning wide-scale deployment in
2019, 5G is a fifth-generation wireless technology that offers much
faster data on digital cellular networks. Huawei, a Chinese company
with close links to the Chinese state, is the world leader in 5G
technology. The United States has repeatedly voiced security
concerns about Huawei’s close relationship to the Chinese state and
that using their technology could give Beijing unprecedented access
to, and even control over, other countries’ communication
technology. In the words of a report published by the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence:
Chinese companies are not only subsidised by the Chinese
government but also legally compelled to work with its intelligence
services. Whether the risk of such collaboration is real or perceived,
the fear remains that adopting 5G technology from Huawei would
introduce a reliance on equipment which can be controlled by the
Chinese intelligence services and the military in both peacetime and
crisis.244

There are alternatives to Huawei’s technology available from
companies, such as Nokia, Ericsson, and Samsung, that are based in
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liberal democracies.245 Yet, Huawei advertises its technology as not
only cheaper to purchase, but lighter, easier, faster, and cheaper to
install, cheaper to maintain, and more energy-efficient.246 Because of
these advantages and despite the warnings from the United States
and NATO, some of the wealthiest nations in the world, including
Switzerland and Saudi Arabia, are opting for Huawei’s technology.247
The calculus for poorer developing nations is likely to be even simpler
and inevitable.248 A massive and rapid change will need to occur if
Huawei is not to dominate the world’s cellular networks in the near
future.
In no small part, Huawei’s success in 5G technology is the result of
strong support from the Chinese state.
A Wall Street Journal review of Huawei’s grants, credit facilities, tax
breaks and other forms of financial assistance details for the first
time how Huawei had access to as much as $75 billion in state
support as it grew from a little-known vendor of phone switches to
the world’s largest telecom-equipment company — helping Huawei
offer generous financing terms and undercut rivals’ prices by some
30%, analysts and customers say.249

As security concerns related to the rollout of Huawei-powered 5G
networks grow, the United States is finally reacting. In January 2020,
a bipartisan group of U.S. senators introduced legislation that would
provide over $1 billion for the development of 5G alternatives to
Huawei.250 Yet, with funding a fraction the size of what Huawei
received, and 5G technology already being implemented, the
initiative seems like far too little, far too late. Just as 5G technology
gives insight into potential Chinese dominance of smart cities, it
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echoes China’s success in previous races for technology, especially
renewable energy.251
What makes these examples truly worrying from the perspective of
smart cities is that China beat wealthy democracies in the
development of technologies such as 5G and solar panels, even
though these technologies are not subject to nearly the same level of
concern, complexity, and negative public onion as many smart cities
technologies.
D. Battlegrounds for the Meaning of Smart Cities?

City Brain is already being implemented in Malaysia’s most
populous metropolis.252 This points to Southeast Asia as the probable
location of the first battleground in the contest of smart city
technology between the PRC and democracies. Geographically, the
countries of Southeast Asia are relatively close to China. Most have
large ethnic Chinese communities that have traditionally worked in
business and may maintain business ties to China.253 Southeast Asian
countries also have relatively similar levels of development to
China,254 and relatively positive attitudes towards the PRC, at least
compared to other Asian countries like India, Japan, and South
Korea.255 They also have generally more authoritarian and less
democratic tendencies.256 These last two factors could be important
for minimizing public opinion pushback against projects that could
give not only their countries’ leaders but Chinese companies and even
the Chinese state, the key to ubiquitous surveillance of their cities.
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Southeast Asia is not unique, however, in their increasingly
overflowing and traffic-clogged cities, which are badly in need of
improved infrastructure and services.257 Even if Chinese tech
companies do not find Southeast Asia to be fertile ground for their
smart cities technology, as Alibaba seems to hope, other regions like
the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa,
and even Latin America all offer likely opportunities because they
suffer from many of the same problems arising from rapid
urbanization.258
None of this is to suggest, however, that people, companies, or
governments in developing countries outside China lack agency. A
country like India with a huge population and an already impressive
technology sector could still emerge as to equal or even outmatch the
smart city technology developed in China and wealthy democracies.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD

While we recognize that smart city efforts like Quayside face
serious and unanswered questions about data and digital
infrastructure, we argue three major reasons why democracies must
continue to develop smart cities technology with all deliberate speed.
First, many of the questions about data privacy and digital
infrastructure can only be answered through real working examples of
smart cities technology. Some projects may fail to produce results.
Others may end up being viewed as not responsive enough to terms
and concerns related to data protection. Yet, if there is any lesson to
be drawn from the experiences of the digital revolution, it is that both
experiences of failure and the creation of successful models are
necessary for smart cities to continue to advance. Smart cities
developers may have to “move fast and break things” (Facebook’s
motto until 2014),259 especially if they are to catch up with their
Chinese competitors.
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Second, smart cities projects have the potential to be important
parts of the solution to pressing global issues such as climate change
and inequality. Many of the technologies with the most potential to
address these problems are the least objectionable. Smart cities
should not be only about the shiniest technology and fastest
processors. Instead, they should take data seriously and focus on
those technologies that offer the most advantage the most efficiently
— even if that is something as simple as wood construction.
Third, if democracies do not develop and regulate their own smart
cities technology, the spread of PRC-based technology will go largely
unchallenged. Democracies should not let the great be the enemy of
the good. Some compromises and sacrifices of data privacy may be
necessary to strike a balance and move smart cities technologies
forward before China gains an advantage in smart cities that is
insurmountable. Temporary concessions to Google over a project
like Quayside could be rolled back relatively easily by democratic
governments. Cities-worth of cameras feeding into Alibaba’s servers
will, conversely, be far harder to undo.
Finally, we offer two major recommendations that we believe could
help in the development of smart cities in the democratic world.
First, massive government investment in smart cities to help counter
the tremendous sums that the PRC has already poured into their
smart cities’ efforts. This must be done before it is too late, as
demonstrated by the example of 5G or solar technology. Second,
clear and transparent laws protecting users and residents must be
implemented and enforced. Violations need to be announced and
punished transparently and publicly. These laws also need to
empower private companies to refuse government requests for data.
The laws should be harmonized within countries and even across as
many democracies as possible. Only this will provide a more or less
unified market that is bigger than China’s market.
In reality, it may be too late for some technologies and projects to
catch up with City Brain in the near term. Every wasted opportunity,
however, moves farther away from the prospect of cities that are not
only smart but also transparent and respectful of individuals’ data.
CONCLUSION

This Article generally assumes that smart cities technology is
coming, whether academics, governments, lawyers, judges, or citizens
like it or not. Even if companies in wealthy democracies do not
develop or implement certain types of technology for legal, political,
commercial, or ethical reasons, companies in other countries, like the
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PRC, will happily sell and implement their smart city technologies.
Indeed, Section II.A discussed how this is already happening.
This Article considers how contrasting approaches to smart cities
has and will impact smart city development, and how the technologies
will be adopted outside of the PRC and wealthy democracies. It is
imperative for established democracies, and the companies based in
them, to continue to move forward with smart cities technology
development and implementation. Further, they should use smart
city technology with the most rigorous standards of transparency and
oversight possible. Because smart city technology will continue to
spread, particularly to the developing world where the will and ability
to guard against its abuse is lower, wealthy democracies must push
forward with the development of smart cities, both to create
technology with better built-in safeguards and to develop and
normalize rolling best practices for data privacy.

